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Census data show that about 60 million, mostly low-income and minority, 
American adults either do not have a bank account or have an account but also rely on 
non-bank financial products to make ends meet.  These products, such as payday loans, 
often have high costs per dollar lent and have historically fallen into gaps in both state 
and federal regulation.  Texas, home of the largest payday lending companies in the 
country and over 2,500 payday lenders, provides an instructive case study of how small-
dollar loan regulation has developed over the years, how non-bank financial institutions 
navigate the law, and how some organizations with non-profit missions have sought to 
offer affordable loan alternatives.  This paper places current lending regulation in 
historical context, surveys federal and Texas law related to small-dollar loans prior to and 
following the financial crisis in 2008, and provides highlights from a federal pilot 
program designed to encourage banks to offer affordable small-dollar loan products.  It 
also examines the experience of a community development financial institution (CDFI) in 
 vi 
Brownsville, Texas that launched a small-dollar loan program in 2012.  The federal pilot 
and Brownsville cases provide insights regarding the viability of affordable small-dollar 
products, as well as the challenges facing non-profit-maximizing institutions such as 
CDFIs when trying to develop loan programs under the current regulatory regime.  
Ultimately this paper concludes that, while there may always be a market for high-cost 
non-bank financial services, a combination of federal efforts to promote affordable 
options at banks and efforts by community-oriented CDFIs can go a long way towards 
providing lower-cost alternatives for people who currently rely on high-cost, non-bank 
products. 
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Statement of the Issues 
A significant portion of Americans, most of whom are low-income and have poor 
credit histories, do not have access to affordable loans needed to make ends meet 
between paychecks and in times of financial crisis.  Mainstream banks have largely 
stopped lending to this population because they have deemed it unprofitable to do so.  
The non-bank lenders that are willing to serve these borrowers do so at high cost and 
often on terms that borrowers do not initially understand.  Attempts to address abuses by 
non-bank lenders have historically been compromised by the interaction between state 
and federal law and by the exploitation of regulatory loopholes.  This has been 
particularly true in Texas, which also has one of the largest non-bank lending sectors in 
the country.  Recently, several organizations have taken steps to provide more affordable 
alternatives to the high-cost products offered by the non-bank financial services sector, 






On May 26, 2011 outgoing Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC), Sheila Bair, gave testimony before the House Subcommittee on 
Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit regarding her agency’s response to the 
financial crisis of 2008.1  After reviewing the causes of the crisis and outlining the steps 
taken by the FDIC in 2008 and 2009 to address bank failures, Chairman Bair turned to 
the role she believes that economic inclusion must play in achieving the FDIC’s mission 
of promoting confidence in the United States’ banking sector.2  In contrast to the unsafe 
lending practices that helped cause the subprime mortgage bubble, economic inclusion, 
she said “is about ensuring that all Americans have access to safe, secure, and affordable 
banking services” that provide “the opportunity to save, build assets, and achieve 
financial security.”3   
As Chairman Bair noted, census data show “that some 17 million [American] 
adults do not have a checking or savings account, and another 43 million adults do have 
an account but also rely on non-bank financial products to make ends meet.”4  These 
“non-bank financial products” come in a variety of forms but they are unified by the fact 
that they are offered by businesses that are not federally insured banks, though they 
frequently have counterparts in the banking sector.5  A 2009 survey by the FDIC of what 
it called the “alternative financial services” sector found that its services are typically 
                                                
1 FDIC Oversight: Examining and Evaluating the Role of the Regulator during the Financial Crisis and 
Today Before the House Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, 112th Cong. (May 
26, 2011) (statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.), available at 








either transactional or related to extensions of credit and include check cashing,6 
remittance transmission,7 refund anticipation loans,8 pawn and car title loans,9 and 
payday loans.10  Though the fees associated with these products are often higher than the 
interest and finance charges on their bank counterparts, industry groups argue that 
products such as small-dollar, short-term loans provide a needed service for millions of 
Americans who have cash shortages but “may not have savings or disposable income.”11 
For more than a decade, however, consumer groups have criticized these non-
bank financial products because of the size of the fees they charge consumers, many of 
whom are from low-to-moderate income households and/or members of minority 
groups.12  Legislators and regulators have also responded to concerns about industry 
                                                
6 “Check cashers typically charge 1 to 4 percent of the face value of the check, depending on the check 
issuer and subject to limitations of state law. About two-thirds of checks cashed at nonbank outlets are 
payroll checks; another 18 percent are state or federal benefits checks.”  Id. at 40. 
7 Remittances are transfers of funds from a sender in one country to a recipient in another, typically using 
channels other than regulated bank wires.  The United States is the most common origination country, as 
the service is frequently used by immigrant workers sending funds to relatives in their home country. Id. at 
40-42. 
8  “Refund anticipation loans (RALs) are short-term loans, usually 7 to 14 days, offered by tax preparers as 
a purported way to speed the taxpayer’s receipt of a tax refund. They are secured by the expected refund, 
and the RAL fee is deducted from the refund . . . The price of a RAL for an average refund of $2,600 can 
range from $58 to $136.” Id. at 44-45 (internal citations omitted). 
9 “Pawn lending is a short-term, secured lending transaction in which the lender typically takes physical 
possession of the item securing the loan (often jewelry or other personal goods). The lending agreement 
allows the pawn lender to take possession of and sell the collateral if the borrower does not meet the terms 
of the agreement.  Recent estimates of the overall scale of pawn lending are not available. However, the 
largest publicly traded pawn lender, Cash America International Inc., with 500 stores in 22 states, reported 
making $514 million in pawn loans in 2007, with APRs ranging from 12 to 300 percent.” Id. at 45.  Car 
title loans are similar to pawn loans but take title of the borrower’s car as collateral.  Id. 
10 “Payday loans are short-term loans typically extended to consumers who have a checking account and 
can prove that they are employed. A check or debit authorization, which is postdated to the borrower’s next 
payday, provides security to the lender. Payday loans typically involve low balances, in the $300 to $500 
range, and have a two-week term coinciding with the consumer’s pay cycle.”  Id. at 43. 
11 Myth vs. Reality: Payday lenders target poor people and minorities, CMTY. FIN. SERV. ASS’N OF AM., 
http://cfsaa.com/aboutthepaydayindustry/myth-vs-reality.aspx (last visited Apr. 20, 2013) (representing 
about half of the payday advance firms in the United States). 
12 See, e.g. URIAH KING & LESLIE PARRISH, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, SPRINGING THE DEBT TRAP: 
RATE CAPS ARE ONLY PROVEN PAYDAY LENDING REFORM 7 (2007), available at 
www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/research-analysis/ springing-the-debt-trap.pdf (“In some very 
limited circumstances, the [payday] borrower pays [the typical fee of] $16 per $100 borrowed to cover an 
 4 
practices and the perception that consumers of higher-cost non-bank financial products 
utilize the industry because they do not have affordable alternatives.  The Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), established by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act), was given powers to regulate 
the safety of non-bank institution financial products, particularly payday loans,13 and the 
FDIC has begun to actively promote the development of affordable small-dollar loan 
products by the banks it oversees.14 
In many ways, the non-bank financial sector is as much a product of American 
bank regulation as it is of anything.  As discussed below, over the years, non-bank 
entities have stepped in to offer products and services that banks would not, either 
because laws expressly banned them from doing so or because a variety of factors—legal 
and otherwise—did not make it profitable to do so.15  Furthermore, the laws that have 
arisen to regulate non-bank financial institutions have frequently been affected by state 
and federal banking regulations and by the attempts of both the U.S. Congress and federal 
courts to preempt state law to promote national policies.16 
                                                                                                                                            
expense, and is free of debt as soon as their [next] paycheck arrives. . . . State regulator data 
demonstrates  that only one to two percent of transactions are made to borrowers who take out one loan, pay 
it off on time, and do not  need to borrow again that year.”); Creola Johnson, America’s First Consumer 
Financial Watchdog is on a Leash: Can the CFPB Use Its Authority To Declare Payday-Loan Practices 
Unfair, Abusive, and Deceptive?, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 381, 387-95 (2012) (describing how—in addition to 
the high per dollar borrowing fees—the automatization of payday loan payments can result in repeated 
electronic draws on borrowers’ empty checking accounts that rack up insufficient funds fees, and 
describing the high percentage of the payday lending industry’s revenues that come from refinancing—
“roll-over”—fees, as opposed to coming from the basic fees for the initial loan); TEX. APPLESEED, 
RESHAPING THE FUTURE OF SMALL-DOLLAR LENDING IN TEXAS 7-9 (2012), available at 
http://www.texasappleseed.net/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=698&Itemid= 
(describing the payday lending industry in Texas and synthesizing studies from Texas community groups 
regarding observed effects of payday loan debt on clients and other community members).  
13 Part III.B.2, infra. 
14 Part III.B.1, infra.  See also Bair Testimony, supra note 1 (highlighting FDIC initiatives such as its 
Small-Dollar Loan Pilot program designed to demonstrate how “banks can profitably offer affordable 
small-dollar loans as an alternative to high-cost credit products, such as payday loans.”). 
15 Part I.A & B, infra. 
16 Part II.A, infra. 
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Nowhere have the battles over the regulation of non-bank financial institutions 
and products been more contentious or evident than in the area of payday loans.  These 
loans, which are described in greater detail below, are typically small-dollar ($300-$500), 
short term (a paycheck cycle) loans extended to borrowers who can prove employment 
and possession of a checking account.17 With fees that typically run $10-$20 per term, 
per $100 lent, if payday loans are refinanced multiple times, they can become very costly 
for borrowers.18  The number of payday lending locations in the United States grew from 
about 500 in 1990 to 22,000 in 2006, having peaked at over 24,000 in 2005.19 The rapid 
growth of the industry, the size of its revenues,20 and concerns about customers who pay 
thousands of dollars in fees on cash advances of only a couple hundred dollars have led to 
calls for increased regulation and innovative alternatives to the traditional payday 
model.21    
Texas, home of Cash America (the largest payday lender in the country)22 and 
about 2,700 payday lending locations in 2010,23 offers an instructive case study of how 
                                                
17 Part I.C.1, infra. 
18 CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION MANUAL Short-Term, Small-
Dollar Lending Procedures 2 (2d. ed. 2012), available at 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201210_cfpb_supervision-and-examination-manual-v2.pdf [hereinafter 
CFPB MANUAL]; KING, supra note 12, at 7.  
19 LESLIE PARRISH & URIAH KING, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, PHANTOM DEMAND: SHORT-TERM 
DUE DATE GENERATES NEED FOR REPEAT PAYDAY LOANS, ACCOUNTING FOR 76% OF TOTAL VOLUME 5, 
11 tbl.5 (2009), available at http:// www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/research-
analysis/phantom-demand-final.pdf; see also About the Payday Advance Industry, CMTY. FIN. SERV. ASS’N 
OF AM., http://cfsaa.com/aboutthepaydayindustry.aspx (“Industry analysts estimate that 20,600 payday 
advance locations across the United States extend about $38.5 billion in short-term credit to millions of 
working Americans in 19 million households who experience cash-flow shortfalls.”). 
20 Though it has recently reported a decline in profits, “[t]he country’s largest payday lender and pawn 
shop operator, Cash America International Inc. . . . [saw] [r]evenue r[i]se 19% from $345.9 [in 2011] to 
$411.6 million [in 2012], mainly on a 36% jump in consumer loan fees to $180.7 million.”  The Payday 
Lender Cash America Cancels Spin-off After Poor Results, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, MARKET WATCH 
(July 26, 2012, 2:22 p.m.), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/payday-lender-cash-america-cancels-spin-
off-after-poor-results-2012-07-26 [hereinafter MARKET WATCH]. 
21 TEX. APPLESEED, supra note 12, at 10. 
22 MARKET WATCH, supra note 20; Company History, CASH AMERICA, 
http://www.cashamerica.com/AboutUs/CompanyHistory.aspx (last visited April 20, 2013) 
 6 
small-dollar and payday loan regulation has developed over the years, how non-bank 
financial institutions have navigated these laws, and how some non-profit-maximizing 
organizations have sought to offer affordable alternatives to high-cost financial products.  
This paper will explore the evolution of payday lending and its regulation in Texas in the 
context of national developments related to banking and non-bank financial services.  
Part I provides overviews of the banking sector, the history of interest rate regulation 
(“usury”) and early small-dollar lending, and modern small-dollar loans.  Part II surveys 
federal and Texas laws related to small-dollar lending regulation prior to the financial 
crisis in 2008 and 2009.  Part III examines changes to Texas and federal law following 
the financial crisis and the potential effects of these developments.  Finally, Part IV 
examines the case of an affordable small-dollar loan program run by a community 
development financial institution (CDFI) in Brownsville, Texas.  This program, called the 
Rio Grande Valley Community Loan Center, offers insights regarding the viability of 
such ventures and the challenges of developing them under the current regulatory regime 
as a non-profit maximizing CDFI.  Ultimately this paper suggests that, while there may 
always be a market for high-cost, non-bank financial services, a combination of the 
FDIC’s efforts to promote affordable bank options and the encouragement of efforts such 
as those of the Rio Grande Valley Community Loan Center can help increase the 




                                                                                                                                            
23 TEX. APPLESEED, supra note 12, at 7. 
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Part I.  Banks, Non-Bank Lending, and the “Underbanked” 
As concerns have risen in recent years about the cost of non-bank financial 
services and certain practices in the industry, there have been many calls for regulation 
on both the state and federal levels.  Before turning to a more in-depth discussion of 
industry regulation on both the federal level and in Texas, it is important to understand 
the historical and structural context in which existing regulatory regimes developed.  This 
section will provide more detail about banking, the origins of the non-bank financial 
services industry, and the contemporary consumers of non-bank financial services.  It 
begins with a brief overview of the mainstream banking sector, which is intimately 
connected with the non-bank financial services industry and affects financial regulation 
across the board.  It then moves to a history of interest rate regulation in the United States 
and the connection between rate regulation and the emergence of the first non-bank 
lenders.  It concludes with a survey of some scholarly research into the consumers of 
non-bank financial services, particularly the “unbanked” and “underbanked.” 
 
A.  OVERVIEW OF BANK REGULATION 
In order to understand the regulatory system that governs bank and non-bank 
lenders (non-bank financial services) in the United States, it is important to identify the 
basic players and recognize that the current system is largely a function of historical 
precedent.24 
The first important distinction concerns whether a financial institution is a 
depository or non-depository lender.  Depository institutions, which take money from 
                                                
24 See generally Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Expansion of State Bank Powers, The Federal Response, and 
the Case for Preserving the Dual Banking System, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 1133 (1990) (explaining the 
origins and operation of the dual—state and federal—system for chartering and regulating banks). 
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customers and generate revenue by lending out deposited funds, have long been the 
subject of state and federal regulation because they hold funds for the general public.25  
These institutions come in three basic forms: commercial banks, savings and loan 
associations (sometimes called “thrifts”), and credit unions.26  The differences among 
these entities, which have eroded greatly in recent years, originally stemmed from the 
nature of their ownership, clientele, and lending products.27  Today the importance of the 
distinction lies largely in that it dictates the regulations and regulators to which each is 
subject.  The only type of depository institution that will be discussed further in this paper 
will be commercial banks.28   
Non-depository institutions such as personal finance companies do not accept 
public deposits.29  Instead, they must seek lending capital on the market, which used to 
mean that they charged borrowers higher rates of interest than depositories to cover their 
higher capital costs.30  As with the traditional distinctions among banks, savings and 
loans, and credit unions, however, the differences between the lending products offered 
by depository and non-depository institutions have eroded since deregulation allowed 
depository institutions to branch into less traditional products and non-depositories have 
                                                
25 NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., CONSUMER CREDIT REGULATION: CREDIT CARDS, PAYDAY LOANS, AUTO 
FINANCE AND OTHER NON-MORTGAGE CREDIT 16 (2012) [hereinafter CONSUMER CREDIT REGULATION] 
26 Id. at 17-19.   
27 See id. (describing the historical development of the different types of institutions, what lending products 
they specialized in, and what parts of the credit market they specialized in). 
28 See id. at 17 (discussing how some states chartered both “industrial banks,” which were more like 
consumer finance corporations, and “mutual savings banks,” which were less like commercial banks than 
they were like national savings associations and credit unions). 
29 Id. at 16. 
30 See LENDOL CALDER, FINANCING THE AMERICAN DREAM 115 (1999) (explaining the differences 
between how commercial bankers and moneylenders acquire lending capital and how this affects 
borrowing rates); see also CONSUMER CREDIT REGULATION, supra note 26, at 16 (explaining that high rate 
loans were traditionally the purview of non-depository lenders). 
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moved into areas such as mortgage lending.31  The formal differences between depository 
and non-depository lenders, however, still dictate how the entities are regulated.32 
The next major distinction among financial institutions relates to which 
government grants an entity’s charter.  Until the Civil War, states were basically the only 
governments chartering depository institutions, so essentially all “banks” were creatures 
of and subject to the laws of the states in which they were chartered.33  The National 
Bank Act of 1863, which was aimed largely at funding the Union’s involvement in in the 
war, created the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and empowered it to 
charter and examine national banks.34  Though Congress anticipated that the new 
structure would prompt state banks to voluntarily convert to national charters, few did, 
resulting in a dual system of bank regulation35 wherein the choice of whether to be 
chartered by a state or federal agency36 would dictate which government entity would be 
the bank’s primary regulator and examiner.37   
                                                
31 See id. at 16, n.119 (observing that non-depositories have branched into areas such as home equity loans 
and citing Cathy Lesser Mansfield, The Road to Subprime “HEL” Was Paved with Good Congressional 
Intentions: Usury Deregulation and the Subprime Home Equity Market, 51 S.C. L. REV. 473 (2000) for an 
analysis of how this shift occurred). 
32 CONSUMER CREDIT REGULATION, supra note 26 at 16.   
33 Wilmarth, supra note 24, at 1153.  The First and Second Banks of the United States had been charted in 
the early nineteenth century to perform the functions of a central bank but after their charters expired, there 
were no more national banks until the Civil War.  Id. 
34 THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, The Founding of the Fed, 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/history_article.html (last visited March 2, 2013).  The National 
Bank Act was revised in both 1864 and 1865.  Id.  
35 Wilmarth, supra note 24, at 1153-54. 
36 The OCC charters national banks and The National Credit Union Association (NCUA) charters national 
credit unions.  CONN. DEP’T OF BANKING, The ABCs of Banking: Lesson Two: Banks, Thrifts, and Credit 
Unions - What's the Difference?, http://www.ct.gov/dob/cwp/view.asp?a=2235&q=297886 (last visited 
April 20, 2013). The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) used to charter and supervise national savings and 
loan associations but it was effectively absorbed into the OCC under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act.  Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit. III, §§ 311-313, 124 Stat. 1376 (July 21, 2010).   
37 Christine E. Blair and Rose M. Kushmeider, Challenges to the Dual Banking System: The Funding of 
Bank Supervision, 18 FDIC BANKING REV. no.1, 2006, at 1, available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/2006mar/article1. The chartering entity will initially assess 
whether the bank has sufficient capital and competent management.  Later it will monitor the institution to 
ensure that it engages in safe, sound banking practices and complies with other laws related to issues such 
 10 
Two other federal agencies have supervisory powers over state and federal banks 
that overlap with those of the banks’ primary regulators.  These powers include the 
ability to set standards for safe and sound banking practices (including establishing 
capital requirements) and to examine the entity for compliance with these standards.38  
The Federal Reserve Board (FRB), which runs the United States’ central bank, has 
supervisory power over all national banks, which must be members of the Federal 
Reserve System, and over those state banks that choose to be members.39  
The FDIC, which has provided deposit insurance since the Great Depression, has 
supervisory power over all the banks it insures.40  All national banks and state bank that 
are members of the Federal Reserve System are required to purchase FDIC insurance and 
all other state banks have the option of doing so.41  If a state bank is a member of the 
Federal Reserve System the FRB will be its primary federal regulator and the FDIC will 
have residual supervisory powers.42  The FDIC is the sole federal regulator for non-
member banks that it insures.43 
Non-depository institutions have traditionally been subject to less regulation than 
depository lenders.44  As businesses, they are usually legal entities that must be formed 
under and subject to state business laws.  Most non-depository institutions will be subject 
to state and federal regulations specific to their business (lending) activities, particularly 
                                                                                                                                            
as fair lending. The regulator will also be charged with writing rules under applicable laws, investigating 
charges of malfeasance raised against the bank, and closing the bank in an orderly manner if it fails.  CONN. 
DEP’T OF BANKING, The ABCs of Banking: Lesson Three: Banks and Their Regulators, 
http://www.ct.gov/dob/cwp/view.asp?a=2235&q=297888 (last visited April 20, 2013). 
38 See THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 60-62 (9th ed. 2005), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_complete.pdf 





44 CONSUMER CREDIT REGULATION, supra note 25, at 16. 
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state licensing and small loan laws.45  As will be discussed in greater detail in Part II.A.2, 
however, non-depository lenders can also be indirectly affected by the regulation of the 
depository banks when they seek lending capital.   
 
B.  USURY AND THE ECONOMICS OF SMALL-DOLLAR LENDING 
Interest rate caps are one of the many restrictions that governments place on the 
business operations of banks and other lenders.  In its most simple form, interest is the 
return that lenders make for giving borrowers the use of their money for a period of 
time.46  It can also be thought of as the fee that borrowers pay for being given the ability 
to use that money.47  Interest is usually calculated as a percentage of the loan principal, 
which distinguishes it from most other flat fees and charges associated with borrowing 
and lending money.   
Historically there have been various restrictions—commonly referred to as 
“usury” laws—on the proportion of the loan principal that lenders could charge as 
interest.48  The term “usury” is derived from the Latin “to use” and was originally 
synonymous with interest (i.e. the fee for using money).49  However, in the modern sense, 
the word has come to be defined as “the charging of an illegal rate of interest as a 
condition to lending money.”50  Thus, in order for interest to be formally considered 
                                                
45 Id. at 19. 
46 MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, Interest, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/interest 
(last visited April 20, 2013). 
47 Id. 
48 CALDER, supra note 30, at 113. 
49 MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, Usury, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/usury?show=0&t=1363018666 (last visited April 20, 2013). 
50 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, Usury (9th ed. 2009).  
 12 
“usurious,” there must be a law establishing a threshold interest rate below which lending 
will be considered legal.    
Though a complete history of usury regulation is beyond the scope of this paper, 
it is important to understand how usury laws in the United States have been connected to 
both the refusal of mainstream depository institutions to make small loans and the rise of 
alternative lending institutions.  American usury laws are descendants of European ones 
but they have persisted in the United States long after many European countries stopped 
regulating interest rates.51  Until the emergence of alternative rate (“small loan”) laws in 
the mid-twentieth century, most jurisdictions had an absolute rate ceiling between five 
and twelve percent a year.52  This cap applied to all loans regardless of the margin 
between lenders’ costs and revenues. 
One problem with having a single usury cap applicable to all types of loans is that 
such a scheme does not account for variations in lender costs related to acquiring funds 
and servicing loans.  Small-dollar loans have traditionally been relatively expensive to 
make and service because the costs of running credit checks and handling administrative 
paperwork is the same for all loans but small loans yield less interest revenue than larger 
ones, which reduces profit margins for lenders.53  Because these loans cost so much to 
make in comparison with the revenue they could generate, regular banks (depository 
                                                
51 CALDER, supra note 30, at 114-15. 
52 Id. at 115. 
53 Id.  A two-year study of small-dollar loan programs at state banks conducted by the FDIC in 2008 and 
2009 confirmed this financial analysis.  As is discussed in more detail in Part III.B(1), the origination and 
servicing costs of small-dollar loans (under $2500) were barely covered by the 36 percent APR required by 
the FDIC. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., A Template for Success: The FDIC’s Small-Dollar Loan Pilot 
Program, 4 FDIC Q., no. 2, 2010, at 32, available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/quarterly/2010_vol4_2/FDIC_Quarterly_Vol4No2_SmallDollar.pdf 
[hereinafter FDIC Small-Dollar Pilot]. 
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institutions) did not generally offer them, but that did not mean there was not a market for 
small-dollar, short-term consumer credit.54 
As the United States industrialized in the late nineteenth century, more people 
moved off farms and into cities to take hourly wage jobs related to factory production.55  
A by-product of this industrialization and urbanization processes was that, while people 
often did not have large incomes, when they did get paid it was in amounts great enough 
to allow them to rise above the standard of living they had enjoyed in rural 
communities.56  This rising standard of living brought with it the desire to make 
purchases even when consumers did not have cash available between pay days.  Because 
banks would not make the small-dollar, short-term loans necessary to cover these gaps, 
non-bank lenders began to offer these products outside of the lending channels typically 
regulated by the law. 57  
 Some of these original small-dollar lenders were generally reputable business 
people like payroll clerks and warehouse operators looking to make a little extra money 
on the side while charging fees necessary to cover their costs.58  Others, however, sought 
high profits and were willing to use coercion to collect their fees.59  Even though the high 
rates and scare tactics that these lenders used were technically illegal, borrowers who 
                                                
54 See CALDER, supra note 30, at 115-16 (discussing how usury caps discriminated against small dollar 
lending, contrasting the business models of moneylenders and commercial bankers, and citing the growth 
of the small-dollar market in the latter portion of the nineteenth century). 
55 Id. at 116-17. 
56 Id. at 116. 
57 See id. (providing examples of nineteenth century American small-dollar loan purveyors and quoting 
William Blackstone’s comment that: “Without some profit allowed by law there will be but few lenders, 
and those principally bad men who will break the law and make a profit and then will endeavor to 
indemnify themselves from the danger of the penalty by making the profit exorbitant.”  Id. at n.10.). 
58 Id. at 118 (“Likely candidates to become engaged in [the small-dollar lending] business were payroll 
clerks, who lent to employees; storage and warehouse men, who lent on the security of stored furniture; and 
pawnbrokers, installment furniture dealers, lawyers, bank clerks, insurance agents, and real-estate 
brokers.”). 
59 Id. at 119. 
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accumulated hundreds of dollars in fees and could not pay off their debts were often too 
frightened to contact law enforcement to prosecute the abusive lenders.60 
Even when non-bank lending developed into a sizeable urban industry in the late 
nineteenth century and evidence began to mount that lending practices were creating 
large debts for borrowers, legislators (mostly on the state level) were largely unwilling to 
adjust usury laws in a way that would make profitable small-dollar lending a legal 
business.61  Usury laws have persisted for a variety of reasons, some moral, some 
cultural, some political, some avaricious, and some a combination of one or more of the 
above.   There has always been a moral element to the concept of usury—both the sense 
that charging high interest rates is abusive on the part of the lender and skepticism about 
the character of borrowers who appear to be taking on debt to live beyond their means.62  
This moralistic influence on policy has long been in tension with economic arguments 
that might favor allowing higher rates for certain loans in order to make them profitable 
enough for mainstream lenders to offer.63  
Another factor in the American usury story is the gap that developed during the 
industrial age between the sensibilities and economic needs of rural farmers, on the one 
hand, and those of urban wage workers, on the other.64  As people left the farm and 
moved to cities they lost the ability to turn to the land for sustenance during periods of 
financial instability and, consequently, the need for short-term access to funds 
increased.65  Despite this growing need, however, most of the money lent in nineteenth 
and early twentieth century America was in the form of long-term agricultural loans, so 
                                                
60 Id. at 119. 
61 Id. at 122. 
62 Id. at 111, 113.   
63 Id. at 122-23. 
64 Id. at 123. 
65 Id.  
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farmers’ desire for low interest rates dominated the attention of policy-makers, not the 
concerns of urban workers who needed cash between paydays.66  Finally, it is also worth 
noting that, to the extent that they had political power, abusive lenders lobbied hard to 
keep usury laws in place, realizing that there would be a smaller market for their services 
if mainstream lenders could make small dollar loans profitably but not at the exorbitant 
rates they charged.67 
Progressive Era reformers saw the misery caused by high-cost, abusive loans and 
some even came to see the role that indiscriminate usury laws played in creating a market 
for predatory products.  Some reformers attempted to offer alternative loan products 
subsidized by charitable funds but they could never achieve the loan volume needed to 
provide serious competition for the predatory lenders.68  Real change began towards the 
end of World War I with the passage of small dollar loan laws in many states that 
legitimized the lending of small amounts at rates higher than the usury caps but below 
those charged by abusive lenders.69  This was the first step in the development of the 
mainstream personal finance industry that eventually produced the modern credit cards 
needed to fuel a consumer economy that was dependent upon a wider swath of society 
having ready access to cash.70  However, these first small dollar loan laws and early 
personal finance companies were still a long way from the business model of the modern 
payday lending industry, discussed in the next section. 
 
                                                
66 Id. at 123. 
67 Id. at 122. 
68 Id. at 120-22. 
69 Id. at 134 
70 Id. at 16-20 (discussing how modern credit card products actually trace their roots to lending 
developments during the Progressive Era and World War I). 
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C.  THE TURN OF THE MILLENNIUM SMALL-DOLLAR LOAN 
1. The Product 
The modern payday loan started in the 1990s as the deregulation of the banking 
industry and growth of information technology made capital more available and 
transactions easier to process.71   For the last decade or so scholars, consumer advocates, 
and regulators have sought to define the products being offered by these lenders to raise 
public awareness of and regulate industry practices.72  In many cases, however, as soon 
as regulators were able to define payday loans by a set of characteristics, lenders would 
augment their products to bypass the prevailing legal definition.73   
The newly created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (CFPB) October 
2012 examination manual presents a broad definition of payday loans, which it calls 
“short-term small dollar lending” products.74  According to the CFPB, there are generally 
three unifying characteristics of these loan products.75  First, they are “small-dollar,” 
though the CFPB does not provide a dollar range of what is constitutes “small.”  Second, 
they are “short-term,” meaning that “borrowers must repay loan proceeds quickly,” 
                                                
71 See ROBERT D. MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION: THE CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICA’S ADDICTION TO 
CREDIT 195-200, 205-208 (2000) (discussing how the dismantling of the Glass-Steagall Act and other 
deregulatory acts of the 1990s led banks to withdraw services from low income neighborhoods, how non-
bank financial services emerged to fill the gap, and how technological advances—particularly automated 
check processing—made payday and check cashing services more prevalent).  
72 Robert W. Snarr, Fed. Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, No Cash ‘til Payday: The Payday Lending 
Industry, COMPLIANCE CORNER, First Quarter 2002, at CC1, available at 
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/bank-resources/publications/compliance-corner/2002/first-
quarter/q1cc_02.pdf; Johnson, supra note 12, at 397.  See also GARY RIVLIN, BROKE, USA: FROM 
PAWNSHOPS TO POVERTY, INC.: HOW THE WORKING POOR BECAME BIG BUSINESS 118-27, 312-16 (2010) 
(describing his interactions with payday loan customers, lenders, and consumer advocates, as well as the 
increasing prevalence of customers with multiple loan roll-overs). 
73 Johnson, supra note 12, at 396-401 (describing tactics including increasing loan terms to 121 days when 
a state statute defined payday loans as those not exceeding 120 days and making loans open-ended—like 
lines of credit—to get around rate caps); Snarr, supra note 72, at CC3 (describing how some payday 
lenders “devised variations” on their products following adverse state court rulings and other attempts to 
regulate the industry). 
74 CFPB MANUAL, supra note 18, at Short-Term, Small-Dollar Lending Procedures 2. 
75 Id. 
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which usually constitutes a two-week base term but could be as long as 6 months.76  
Finally, “they require that a borrower give lenders access to repayment through a claim 
on the borrower’s deposit account.”77 
Other than the three basic traits, the CFPB manual observes that “other features 
vary.”78  With respect to payment structures, the manual notes that typical short-term, 
small dollar loans are “structured to [be paid] off in one balloon payment,” though 
“installment payments and interest-only payments are not unusual.”79  These loans can be 
“closed-end” or “open” like a line of credit that is continually drawn down and 
periodically partially repaid.  Funds “may be disbursed in cash, on a prepaid card, 
through the Automated Clearing House (“ACH”) network, or by check.”80  Unlike 
mainstream lenders, providers of small-dollar, short-term loans do not typically conduct 
extensive investigations into a borrower’s credit-worthiness (sometimes called 
“underwriting”).81  Instead, the main eligibility criteria typically are that the borrower 
have a job (which will ostensibly produce periodic income) and a checking account that 
can be debited in the event that the borrower does not actively repay the loan on time.82  
One of the most frequently discussed characteristics of short-term, small dollar 
loan products is the aggregate cost of their interest, fees, and other charges.  As the CFPB 
writes, “most loans . . . have finance charges of $15 to $20 per each $100 borrowed,” 
though “finance charges can vary due to factors including differences in state law.”83  
Given that the typical payday loan term is two weeks, $15 to $20 per term per $100 










borrowed would translate into “391 percent to 521 percent” of the sum borrowed if the 
fee was paid every two weeks for a year.84  This calculation (total interest and fees 
divided by the loan principal) is called the Annual Percentage Rate (“APR”) and is meant 
to provide a common metric for consumers to compare the aggregate costs of different 
types of credit over a standard term.  Non-bank lenders have argued that APR is 
misleading in the context of their products, which they say are meant to be used over 
short periods of time, not for a whole year.85  Consumer advocates, on the other hand, 
argue that typical borrowers cannot satisfy the terms of these loans on such a short time 
frame.86  Instead, these borrowers have to refinance (“roll-over”) their loans multiple 
times and/or take out multiple new loans to service their prior obligations, ultimately 
paying lenders fees in amounts that are several times the value of the original cash 
advance.87   
While the non-bank lending sector’s argument regarding the use of the APR 
metric is valid on its face, recent studies showing that over two-thirds of borrowers in 
some states take out multiple payday loans each year seem to support the need to use an 
aggregate measurement of the product’s borrowing costs.88  It is not clear, however, 
whether that metric should be an APR calculated by assuming that the base fee would be 
paid out over a whole year.  Determining an appropriate metric would require better data 
                                                
84 Id. 
85 See, e.g Myth vs. Reality: Payday loans are extremely expensive and have exorbitant interest rates, 
CMTY. FIN. SERV. ASS’N OF AM., http://cfsaa.com/aboutthepaydayindustry/myth-vs-reality.aspx (last visited 
Apr. 20, 2013); see also S. ECON. DEV., SUBCOMM. ON CONSUMER CREDIT LAWS, INTERIM REP. TO THE 
77TH TEX. LEG., 76th Reg. Sess., at 12 (2000), available at 
http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/scanned/interim/76/ec74c.pdf [hereinafter TEX. SUBCOMM. ON CONSUMER 
CREDIT] 
86 Johnson, supra note 12, at 391-94; KING & PARRISH 2007, supra note 12, at 7. 
87 Id. at 7-8.  
88 See PARRISH & KING 2009, supra note 19, at 7-9 (offering results of a survey of borrowers in Oklahoma 
and Florida). 
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than is currently available regarding issues such as how many times the average borrower 
rolls over his or her loans each year. 
 
2. The Customer 
Having defined the general parameters of the typical short-term, small dollar loan, 
this section turns to a brief overview of the non-bank financial services customers.  Due 
to the disparate nature of state regulation of the non-bank financial services industry, it is 
hard to obtain exact statistics on who uses non-bank financial products.  Scholars often 
offer anecdotes89 and examples from local surveys90 to support their arguments.  Since 
the 2009 financial crisis, however, both the FDIC91 and Federal Reserve92 have 
conducted studies of individual borrowing patterns, with a particular focus on borrowers 
who use non-bank financial services.  These national studies, along with more regional 
work sponsored by branches of the Federal Reserve, provide insight into certain 
characteristics of non-bank financial services customers. 
The 2011 FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households 
looked at the relationship between the extent to which a household was “banked” and 
                                                
89 See Johnson, supra note 12, at 391-92 (offering the example of a single mother in Wisconsin who paid 
$1360 on a $300 cash advance). 
90 See Michael S. Barr, et. al., Financial Services, Saving, & Borrowing Among Low- and Moderate-
Income Households, FED. RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND at 21 (February 6, 2009), available at 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/Conferences/2009/2-6-2009/Keys_presentation.pdf [hereinafter 
Detroit Financial Services Survey] (finding that a significant portion of low- to moderate-income users of 
non-bank financial services had trouble meeting other financial obligations). 
91 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 2011 FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED 
HOUSEHOLDS (2011), available at http://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/2012_unbankedreport.pdf 
[hereinafter 2011 FDIC Survey]. 
92 Matthew B. Gross, Jeanne M. Hogarth, & Maximilian D. Schmeiser, Use of Financial Services by the 
Unbanked and Underbanked and the Potential for  Mobile Financial Services Adoption, 98 FED. RES. 
BULL., no. 4, 2012, at 3, available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2012/pdf/mobile_financial_services_201209.pdf. 
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whether and how much it used alternative financial services products.93  Respondents 
were classified as  “‘unbanked’ if they answered ‘no’ to the question, ‘Do you or does 
anyone in your household currently have a checking or savings account?’”94  A 
household was classified as “underbanked” if it (a) had a checking and/or a savings 
account and (b) “had used non-bank money orders, non-bank check cashing services, 
non-bank remittances, payday loans, rent-to-own services, pawn shops, or refund 
anticipation loans (RALs) in the past 12 months.”95  This suggests that the underbanked 
have access to mainstream banking for basic transactions but that something, whether 
personal aversion, institutional rejection, or the absence of appropriate loan products, is 
keeping them from using mainstream banking service for transactions such as credit 
purchases and fund transfers. 
The survey’s major findings were as follows.  First, within the year prior to the 
survey “[p]ayday loans were used by 7.9 percent of underbanked and 1.6 percent of 
unbanked households,”96 compared with 1.7 percent of all U.S. households.97 Second, 
“all underbanked households and 64.9 percent of unbanked households” reported having 
used an alternative financial service in the last year, as opposed to only 25 percent of the 
survey population as a whole.98  Third, 29.5 percent of unbanked households had not 
used any alternative financial product in the last 12 months, suggesting a reliance on cash 
transactions.99  Fourth, the use of alternative financial transactions like money orders was 
                                                
93 2011 FDIC Survey, supra note 91 at 2. 
94 Id. at 2, n.2. 
95 Id.  The FDIC found that “8.2 percent of US households are unbanked” and “20.1 percent of US 
households are underbanked.”  Id. at 2. 
96 Id. at 34. 
97 Id. at 33. 
98 Id. at 6. 
99 Id. at 29. 
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more common than that of alternative credit products like payday loans.100  Finally, “[t]he 
highest unbanked and underbanked rates are found among non-Asian minorities, lower-
income households, younger households, and unemployed households.”101 
A more limited study on the use of alternative financial products by low- and 
moderate-income (LMI) residents of Detroit was presented in 2009 at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Cleveland.  Within its sample of LMI residents, the study found 
statistically significantly higher rates of bankruptcy, eviction, and cut-off utilities and 
phone service within the previous 12 months among users of payday loans than among 
non-users.102  It also found that, among subjects who reported experiencing bankruptcy, 
eviction, and cut-off utilities and phone service within the previous 12 months, a 
statistically significantly higher proportion had used payday loans than had not used 
them.103 
While it is hard to draw sweeping conclusions from these findings—particularly 
given the extremity of the situation in Detroit related to the auto industry collapse in 
2008—there are a few important points.  First, there is a much greater usage of payday 
loans among underbanked individuals than there is in the general U.S. population.104  
Second, this group is more likely to be minority and low-income or unemployed than is 
the fully banked population.  Finally, use of payday products among LMI individuals 
appears to be correlated with higher likelihood of additional financial hardship.  It is not 
clear whether use of payday products actually caused the bankruptcies, evictions, and 
                                                
100 Id. at 33. 
101 Id. at 5. 
102 Detroit Financial Services Survey, supra note 90, at 21. 
103 Id. at 22. 
104 This finding demonstrates that unbanked individuals were no more likely to use the product than the 
general populations, which can probably be partially explained by the fact that ownership of a checking 
account is usually a prerequisite to taking out a payday loan.  See supra note 10 (noting that payday 
customers must have bank accounts).  
 22 
inability to pay other bills observed in the Detroit study.  However, the fact that these 
products—which often involve fees equal to several times the original loan value—are 
being used more frequently by groups having trouble managing their broader financial 
situation should raise questions about whether the market is providing the best financial 




Part II.  Before the Great Recession: Pre-2009 Law 
As discussed in Part I.A, the United States regulates lending by institution, not by 
product category, and the system that has developed to govern depository institutions 
gives state and federal regulators overlapping powers over lenders. The resulting 
interplay between state and federal regulators and the opportunities for businesses to 
structure themselves so as to pick the most desirable regulator have had a significant 
impact on the consumer credit industry and on small-dollar loans in particular.105 
Because state usury laws have traditionally made it unprofitable for bank lenders 
to make small-dollar loans, these products have long been the purview of non-bank 
institutions, which are primarily state-regulated.  The small-dollar loan market that 
developed in the late twentieth century, particularly in Texas, is largely a function of 
federal legal developments beginning in the 1970s regarding the ability of banks to 
“import” out-of-state interest rates and the ability of federal laws to override state ones, 
especially in the areas of rate caps and consumer protection.106   
Both phenomena relied upon the legal concept of federal “preemption.”  When it 
comes to regulating the activities of people and organizations within their borders, states 
are said to have a general police power that allows them to take any action that is not 
prohibited by the U.S. Constitution.107  This is in contrast to federal power, which is 
limited and does not exist in an area unless authorized by some provision of the 
                                                
105 It has become possible at various times for more heavily regulated depository institutions to use 
business relationships with non-depository institutions to gain profits from activities that they would not be 
legally allowed to engage in themselves.  See, e.g., RIVLIN, supra note 72, at 42-55 (describing a class-
action lawsuit brought against Fleet Financial, a non-bank subsidiary of Fleet Bank of Rhode Island, that 
sold arguably predatory home equity loans to elderly African American homeowners in lower income 
neighborhoods on the east coast). 
106 Part II.A.1 & 2 infra. 
107 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 390 (3rd ed. 2006). 
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Constitution.108  When both state and federal governments have the power to act in an 
area and their laws conflict, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has found that, pursuant to 
the Supremacy Clause of the federal constitution, the federal law will control and the 
state law will be invalid.109  As discussed below, lending regulation is an area where both 
state and federal governments have power and where their laws have been found to 
conflict, particularly with respect to the regulation of nationally chartered banks operating 
within state borders.110 
The next part of this section will outline the main federal laws and legal 
developments pertaining to small-dollar lending, discussing them as they existed prior to 
the financial crisis of 2008.   It will then move to Texas law, again, as it stood prior to the 
financial crisis that peaked in 2009 and caused a series of legal reforms. 
 
A.  FEDERAL LAW 
Developments in federal law during the latter portion of the twentieth century 
have had a substantial impact on lending practices around the country.  Beginning with 
judicial and legislative responses to the high interest rates, inflation, and economic 
malaise of the 1970s and culminating in the OCC’s expansive interpretation of the 
preemption doctrine in the 2000s, theses changes greatly diminished the ability of state 
legislators and regulators to control the interest rates and other lending practices of banks 
operating within their borders.    
                                                
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 392 (citing Gade v. Nat’l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 
U.S. (9 Wheat) 1.211 (1824)). 
110 See generally CONSUMER CREDIT REGULATION, supra note 25, at 69, 71-73. 
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1.  Marquette, Interest Rate Caps, and the Relaxation of Usury Laws 
The National Bank Act, which opened the way for national bank charters during 
the Civil War, also sought to protect these banks from potentially hostile state 
governments by allowing each one to choose between a federally set interest rate cap and 
the one set by the state in which the bank was located.111 In 1978’s Marquette National 
Bank v. First of Omaha Corporation the U.S. Supreme Court held that the National Bank 
Act further allowed federally chartered banks using their state rate caps to use those rates 
in the other states in which they operate.112  The decision in Marquette, which involved a 
bank marketing its credit cards in multiple states, was most immediately felt in the area of 
credit card interest rates.113  Once banks were allowed to adopt the rates of states with 
high caps and use them in connection with credit products sold across the country, credit 
cards became more profitable for lenders and credit became more widely available.114  
Furthermore, as bank deregulation and consolidation proceeded into the 1990s, 
depository institutions increasingly chose national charters but picked home states with 
high interest rate caps, which they could now “import” into states with lower caps using 
the Marquette rule.115    
Marquette gave national banks more freedom to charge higher interest rates at a 
time in the late 1970s and early 1980s when inflation was relatively high and the 
economy was not growing quickly.  Since the mid-1970s, bank lenders had been caught 
                                                
111 NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., PREEMPTION AND REGULATORY REFORM: RESTORE THE STATES’ 
TRADITIONAL ROLE AS “FIRST RESPONDER” 4 (2009), available at 
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/preemption/restore-the-role-of-states-2009.pdf [hereinafter STATES AS 
FIRST RESPONDER]. 
112 See Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First of Omaha Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 309-13 (1978) (holding that a 
national bank is “located” in the state cited on its charter and that the rate of the location state can be used 
in other states where the bank does business). 
113 STUART VYSE, GOING BROKE: WHY AMERICANS CANT HOLD ON TO THEIR MONEY 50-55 (2008) 
(describing the connections between Marquette, increases in credit card use, and bankruptcy filings). 
114 Id. at 50.  
115 MANNING, supra note 71, at 88-89. 
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in an increasingly untenable position by rapidly rising market interest rates (which 
affected the price of lending capital), competition for depositors from non-bank 
brokerage houses, and statutory caps on the rates they were permitted to charge 
borrowers.116  Following Marquette, however, national banks, which competed in the 
same markets as state banks, could use rate importation to offer products on more 
profitable terms than were available to state banks that were still constrained by state 
lending laws.117   
It was in this context that Congress moved to limit the effect that state usury laws 
had on state-chartered banks.  In an effort to give state banks more flexibility, Congress 
took steps in the early 1980s to preempt state usury laws for FDIC-insured depository 
institutions with respect to mortgages and loans in excess of $1000.118  No federal usury 
cap was passed to replace the preempted state ones, however, so the burden shifted to the 
states to affirmatively reenact their usury laws in light of the new federal law to avoid 
having them completely repealed.119  Most states responded by acting to preserve their 
basic usury statutes and the limited exceptions that had existed for small-dollar loans, but 
the new versions of these laws frequently had higher rate caps than their predecessors.120  
Some states, furthermore, allowed their general usury statutes to be repealed entirely, 
“allowing parties who were not regulated by special usury statutes to contract for the 
                                                
116 NAT’L COMM’N ON THE CAUSES OF THE FIN. AND ECON. CRISIS IN THE U.S., THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
INQUIRY REPORT 29-35 (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf 
(describing how interest rate caps and capital requirements put depository institutions at a disadvantage vis-
à-vis non-depository financial institutions during the rapid interest rate increases of the 1970s and 1980s); 
MANNING, supra note 71, at 78-80. 
117 See generally CONSUMER CREDIT REGULATION, supra note 25, at 89-93 (discussing state parity laws 
and other legal steps taken to allow state banks to compete with national ones in light of rate importation in 
the 1980s and 1990s). 
118 Id. at 8.  
119 Id. 
120 Id.  
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payment of any agreed rate.”121  The end result of this process was increasing interest rate 
flexibility for both state and national depositories and shifting norms regarding the 
boundaries of what should constitute “fair” interest rates. 
 
2. Rate Importation and Non-bank Lenders 
While Marquette and other changes in federal law had a rather obvious impact on 
the practices of depository lenders, their effect was more indirect with respect to loans 
originated by non-depository institutions.  Though indirect, federal law had a substantial 
impact on small-dollar lending through rate importation in the context of partnerships 
between national banks and non-bank lenders.   
Until 2005 when the OCC and FDIC effectively ended the practice, one tool that 
non-bank lenders used to circumvent state usury caps and consumer lending laws was 
something that came to be known as “rent-a-bank” or “rent-a-charter.”122  Under the 
model, a non-bank lender would partner with a depository institution, frequently based in 
a state with very permissive lending laws, to offer higher-cost loans in states with more 
restrictive laws.123  The loans would technically be originated by the depository 
institution, which could base its rates on the regulations of its home state.  States like 
Delaware and North Dakota had no interest rate limits so depositories charted by those 
states could offer unlimited rates to their partners.  The non-bank lender would handle all 
                                                
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 430. 
123 JEAN ANN FOX, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., UNSAFE AND UNSOUND: PAYDAY LENDERS HIDE BEHIND 
FDIC BANK CHARTERS AND PEDDLE USURY 11 (2004), available at 
http://consumerfed.org/pdfs/pdlrentabankreport.pdf; see also NY v. Cnty. Bank of Rehoboth Beach, DE, 
RJI No. 01-04-080549, slip op. at 3-5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Albany Nov. 20, 2006), available at 
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/unreported/NY_v_County_Bank_Decision.pdf (describing the contractual 
relationship between a Delaware bank, which is not subject to a usury cap, and a payday lender doing 
business in New York, which has a 25 percent APR usury cap).  
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of the marketing, applications, underwriting, and collections activities, however, and 
would actually buy the loan from the bank so that it was the party assuming most of the 
risk.124  Thus, for a time, these partnerships appeared to legitimately be offering loans 
that, when roll-overs accrued, had effective APRs of 500 percent or more in states like 
New York with usury caps around 25 percent a year.125  As noted by the Texas Senate 
Economic Development Subcommittee on Consumer Credit Laws, many Texas non-bank 
lenders viewed this as an attractive model in the late 1990s and early 2000s.126 
 As individuals and states’ attorneys general (such as Eliot Spitzer of New York) 
started to challenge this practice in the early 2000s127 the OCC gradually started 
restricting the actions of its examinees, first by “assert[ing] the right to examine the 
services performed by the non-bank [partners] ‘to the same extent as if the bank were 
performing these services on its own premises.’”128  In 2002 Comptroller of the Currency 
John Hawke stated publically that the right national banks’ charters afforded them to 
preempt state laws was inalienable and announced recent actions taken against a national 
bank that was found to have been essentially renting its charter to a payday lender.129 
Soon thereafter, the OCC effectively ended the practice among nationally chartered banks 
by increasing enforcement actions against institutions known to engage in “payday 
lending activities through third-party lenders,” having found that the programs 
                                                
124 FOX, supra note 123, at 11. 
125 See, e.g., Cnty. Bank of Rehoboth Beach, RJI No. 01-04-080549, slip op. at 3.  
126 TEX. SUBCOMM. ON CONSUMER CREDIT, supra note 85, at 15. 
127 See FOX, supra note 123, at 11-12 (describing actions by the New York Attorney General and by 
private citizens in New Jersey). 
128 CONSUMER CREDIT REGULATION, supra note 25, at 423 (quoting OCC Advisory Letter No. 2000-10 
(Nov. 27, 2000), available at http://www.occ.gov/topics/consumer-protection/payday-lending/index-
payday-lending.html). 
129 FOX, supra note 123, at 17 (citing a speech by then Comptroller of the Currency John Hawke given 
February 12, 2002, available at http://www.occ.gov/static/news-issuances/speeches/2002/pub-speech-
2002-10.pdf). 
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compromised the institutions’ safety and soundness and, in some cases, led to consumer 
abuse.130 Thus, when the OCC made it clear that national banks could suffer 
repercussions for engaging in partnerships to issue payday loans the banks moved away 
from the business. 
 When national banks started abandoning rent-a-bank partnerships with alternative 
lenders the industry turned to state banks, which were mostly regulated by the FDIC and 
could still charge high interest rates using state laws designed to keep state banks 
competitive in light of national bank rate importation.131 In the early 2000s, the FDIC was 
seen as being relatively permissive about its banks’ involvement with payday lenders.132  
The FDIC’s 2003 enforcement guidelines restricted the proportion of regulated banks’ 
required capital that could consist of payday loans, but this had little effect on banks that 
sold their loans into the secondary market rather than holding them as capital.133  
Furthermore, the 2003 FDIC guidance on payday loans “emphasized safety and 
soundness concerns” but did not prohibit rent-a-bank relationship.134  The 2005 guideline 
updates did not prohibit the activity either but enforcement actions were increasingly 
                                                
130 CONSUMER CREDIT REGULATION, supra note 25, at 430; see also FOX, supra note 123, at 17 n.60 
(quoting the OCC’s 2003 Annual Report regarding its actions against “national banks with known payday 
lending activities through third-party vendors”). 
131 FOX, supra note 123, at 19-20.  Fox reports that some banks actually switched from the Federal Reserve 
System to the FDIC so that it could be subject to the FDIC’s more lenient rules about partnering with 
payday lenders.  Id.  The state banks were able to do this using something called the “most favored lender 
doctrine,” which let them charge the highest rate available to any lender in their state for the type of loan in 
question.  CONSUMER CREDIT REGULATION, supra note 25, at 89.  This meant that state banks could use the 
out of state rates that national banks were importing in.  Id. 
132 See FOX, supra note 123, at 20-24. 
133 CONSUMER CREDIT REGULATION, supra note 25, at 424. 
134 FOX, supra note 123, at 22. 
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critical of the practice and “[w]ithin a few years . . .  all FDIC-insured banks had ended 
their payday partnerships.”135 
 
3. Consumer Protection 
Another result of choosing a national charter was that a bank would be a creature 
of federal law and regulated by a federal agency.136  Under the legal doctrine of 
preemption, this meant that state lending laws in the states where the national banks 
operated might not apply if those laws were found to conflict with federal regulations.  
Using this principle, the OCC, issued a series of regulations and advisory letters in the 
early-to-mid 2000’s that restricted the ability of states to enforce their own (often more 
restrictive) consumer protection laws against national banks.137  Though the OCC was 
later found to have exceeded the scope of its powers under the National Bank Act, 
particularly in the area of sub-prime mortgage lending, the decisions of federal regulators 
limited the power of state regulators to control some of the lending practices that have 
been blamed for causing the 2008 financial crisis.138 
                                                
135 CONSUMER CREDIT REGULATION, supra note 25, at 424; FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., DEP'T OF THE 
TREAS., FINANCIAL INSTITUTION LETTER FIL-14-2005, PAYDAY LENDING PROGRAMS REVISED 
EXAMINATION GUIDANCE (2005), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2005/fil1405.html. 
136 Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First of Omaha Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 307 (1978). 
137 Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904 (Jan. 13, 2004) 
(amending 12 C.F.R. pts. 7, 34).  The Dodd-Frank Act made substantial changes to the ability of federal 
regulators to preempt state laws and may effectively overturn the 2004 OCC rule.   CONSUMER CREDIT 
REGULATION, supra note 25, at 73-76. 
138 See RIVLIN, supra note 72, at 214-17 (discussing the effect of OCC preemption on state efforts to 
regulate subprime mortgage lending).  Rivlin’s discussion focuses largely on the OCC’s attempts to use its 
preemption powers to prohibit states’ attorneys general from suing national banks to enforce state laws.  
The U.S. Supreme Court held that this action exceeded the OCC’s preemption powers under the National 
Bank Act in Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n.  557 U.S. 519, 536 (2009). 
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With some notable exceptions,139 few states were able to maintain strong 
consumer credit protection laws through the period of deregulation and preemption.  
Because the United States has chosen to regulate credit by institution type, not product, 
when states lost regulatory power vis-a-vis their depository lenders as a result of rate 
exportation and federal preemption it often seemed futile to place strict regulations on 
non-depository lenders, who would likely find ways to by-pass such rules.140  Particularly 
in the years before the financial crisis, this situation magnified the importance of federal 
consumer protection laws, two of which have implications for small dollar lenders: the 
Truth in Lending Act (TILA)141 and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA).142 
TILA, adopted in 1968, is primarily a disclosure regime, meaning that it operates 
by requiring lenders to make certain information available to consumers prior to the 
origination of loan rather than regulate the substance of the products and decisions that 
lenders make143 The approach is based on the premise that the informed use of credit 
would be good for the economy as a whole and that it would increase competition among 
lenders.144 The required disclosures include, among other things, “the ‘Amount 
Financed,’ which is the amount of money of which the consumer will have actual use, the 
‘Finance Charge,’ which is the total dollar cost of the credit, and the ‘Annual Percentage 
Rate’ (APR), which expresses the cost of the credit on a yearly basis.”145 Federal 
                                                
139 In 2004 Georgia outlawed payday lending as a public nuisance.  CONSUMER CREDIT REGULATION, 
supra note 25, at 412 (citing Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16-7-1 to 16-7-97).  North Carolina law places payday 
loans under the consumer finance act that imposes a 36 percent interest rate cap.  CONSUMER CREDIT 
REGULATION, supra note 25, at 418 (citing N.C.  Gen. Stat. §53-173). 
140 STATES AS FIRST RESPONDER, supra note 111, at 20 (2009). 
141 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 to 1666j (2012). 
142 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691 to 1691f (2012). 
143 See AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, CONSUMER AND BORROWER PROTECTION §3 (2d ed. 2013) (describing 
the Act’s purpose to ensure information disclosure for consumers). 
144 See id. (discussing the Act’s purpose of addressing the problems created by information asymmetries in 
credit transactions). 
145 CONSUMER CREDIT REGULATION, supra note 25, at 23-24. 
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regulations also give specific guidelines on how to calculate these amounts.  Some 
substantive requirements (i.e. more than just disclosures) have been added to TILA in 
recent years, but they are primarily related to credit cards and lines of credit, not small-
dollar, uncollateralized loans.146 
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act prohibits discrimination in the provision of 
credit on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, or age.147  It 
is enforced through Regulation B, which is also now in the portfolio of the CFPB.148 
*** 
These and other developments in federal law during the last forty years created a 
banking sector that was much less regulated than it had historically been and that had 
much greater flexibility to expand business across state lines and diversify product lines 
beyond checking accounts and traditional thirty-year, fixed-rate mortgages.  Federal legal 
developments also reduced states’ ability to control the rates and conditions of lending 
within their borders.  The banks that thrived in this environment often purchased smaller 
depositories and merged with larger banks in other regions.   
The resulting consolidation reduced the prevalence of community banks that 
could meet the needs of borrowers with lower incomes and weaker credit histories.  Non-
bank lenders, which frequently found regulatory gaps that allowed them to access capital 
while still lending at high rates, emerged to fill the need in many communities for small-
dollar, short term lending products.  Because preemption of state lending laws relied on 
federal power over national depository institutions created by the National Bank Act, 
however, the non-bank entities that emerged to dominate the small-dollar industry were 
                                                
146 Id. at 24. 
147 Id. at 44 
148 12 C.F.R. pt. 1002 (2013). 
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still subject to many state laws that were not directly affected by federal preemption.  
Different states have dealt differently with these non-bank lenders.  The experience of 
Texas, to which this paper turns next, provides an example of how one jurisdiction has 
approached small-dollar lending and how non-bank financial service providers have 
navigated the resulting regulatory structure. 
 
B.  TEXAS LAW 
1. Background 
Texas has a somewhat varied history regarding the regulation of creditors’ ability 
to charge interest on the money they lend.   As discussed above, for a lender’s rates to be 
considered “usurious” the law must establish a ceiling on what is considered to be a legal 
rate.  In 1869, during one of the post-Civil War revisions to the state constitution,149 
Texas also “abolished all usury law and prohibited the Legislature from making laws 
limiting the amounts of interest parties could agree upon for loans of money or other 
property.”150  Without a legal limit on rates, lenders could charge whatever borrowers 
would agree to pay.  This effort to allow complete freedom of contract in the state was 
relatively short-lived, however, and the 1876 Texas Constitution reintroduced legal rate 
limits following “a sweeping flood of credit abuses” that were perceived to result from 
the removal of the usury cap.151 
                                                
149 The Constitution: The Radical Republican Constitution of 1869, TEXAS POLITICS, 
http://texaspolitics.laits.utexas.edu/7_2_6.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2013). 
150 TEX. SUBCOMM. ON CONSUMER CREDIT, supra note 85, at 2. 
151 Id. 
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Though the size of the rate caps have changed over the years, since 1876 the 
Texas Constitution has controlled usury in the state in the absence of more specific 
legislation.152  Article Sixteen, § 11 of the Texas Constitution currently reads:  
 
The Legislature shall have authority to define interest and fix maximum 
rates of interest; provided, however, in the absence of legislation fixing 
maximum rates of interest all contracts for a greater rate of interest than 
ten per centum (10%) per annum shall be deemed usurious; provided, 
further, that in contracts where no rate of interest is agreed upon, the rate 
shall not exceed six per centum (6%) per annum.153 
Until the 1960’s there was no legislation providing more specific regulation of allowable 
interest rates so the constitutional caps controlled lending in the state.154  
 By the early 1960s legislators were expressing concern both that small dollar 
loans were expensive for reputable lenders to make and that the consumers were being 
abused by tactics aimed at circumventing the constitutional rate caps.155  These concerns 
led to the passage of the Texas Regulatory Loan Act in 1963,156 which allowed certain 
loans under $1,500 to be made at rates higher than the constitutional cap and created a 
new regulatory agency to monitor the new loan products.157  The 1963 law was limited in 
scope,158 however, and subsequent legislative investigation found pervasive consumer 
                                                
152 Id. 
153 TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 11 (2012). 
154 TEXAS USURY LAW HANDBOOK 8 (Dan L. Nicewander et al. eds., 2d. ed. West 2005) [hereinafter 
USURY HANDBOOK]; see also OFFICE OF CONSUMER CREDIT COMM’R, STRATEGIC PLAN 2005-2009, 
APPENDIX I: HISTORY, http://www.occc.state.tx.us/pages/agency/strat05/i.html [hereinafter OCCC HISTORY 
APPENDIX] (providing a timeline of consumer credit regulation in Texas).  
155 See id. (“1958: The Texas Legislative Council reports to the Legislature that, "Small loans are the most 
expensive of all types of loans to make and service." That council recommends Texas enact a small loan 
law, citing three primary abuses of borrowers: excessive charges, pyramiding of loans, and harassment of 
borrowers in collection practices.”). 
156 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6165b (West 1963), repealed by Act effective Oct. 2, 1967, 60th Leg., 
R.S., ch. 274, § 5, 1967 TEX. GEN. LAWS 659. 
157 OCCC HISTORY APPENDIX, supra note 154.  The agency created, the Office of Regulatory Loan 
Commissioner, was the processor to the current Office of Consumer Credit Commissioner (OCCC). 
158 USURY HANDBOOK, supra note 154, at 8 (“Th[e] Act did not deal with retail installment sales and only 
covered loans of $1,500 . . . or less.”). 
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abuse that was not being addressed by then-existing usury laws.159  Four years later, 
however, the legislature passed House Bill 452 (part of the Acts of 23 May 1967),160 
overhauling the Interest, Consumer Credit, and Consumer Protection portion of the 
state’s civil code and making “the first [substantial] attempt to allow usury rates above 10 
percent . . . on a large scale” in Texas.161  
 Consumer loans in Texas now fall into two general categories: (1) those that 
charge under 10 percent a year and are essentially unregulated and (2) those that charge 
more than 10 percent a year and are regulated by the Office of Consumer Credit 
Commissioner (OCCC).  This occurs because, while § 302.001 of the Finance Code 
codifies the ten percent constitutional usury rule,162 Chapter 303 of the Code only 
requires OCCC licensing and regulation of lenders offering loans at the higher rates 
allowed by that chapter.163   There are several classes of higher-rate loans that have their 
                                                
159 See Acts 1967, 60th Leg. R.S., ch. 274, § 1, 1967 TEX. GEN. LAWS 608–09, available at 
http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/scanned/sessionLaws/60-0/HB_452_CH_274.pdf (outlining legislative findings 
leading to the decision to create “a comprehensive code of legislation to clearly define interest and usury, to 
classify and regulate loans and lenders, to regulate credit sales and services, and place limitations on 
charges imposed in connection with such sales and services, to provide for consumer education and debt 
counseling, to prohibit deceptive trade practices in all types of consumer transactions, and to provide firm 
and effective penalties for usury and other prohibited practices.”). 
160 Acts 1967, 60th Leg. R.S., ch. 274, 1967 TEX. GEN. LAWS 608–60. 
161 USURY HANDBOOK, supra note 154, at 8.  “However, the unspoken purpose of Subtitle 2 of the [Code 
created by the 1967 Act] was to allow certain Texas lenders (mainly banks) to charge interest rates in 
excess of the constitutional ceiling of 10 percent per annum on certain installment loans.  The trade-off was 
that, in order to charge such higher rates, these lenders would be subject to licensing (at least for nonbank 
lenders) and would have certain disclosure requirements as well as other additional duties and prohibitions.  
Texas lenders were so desirous of charging in excess of the constitutional limit of 10 percent per annum 
that they willingly and knowingly accepted the additional burdens of licensing, disclosure, and other duties.  
In 1967, the lenders paid little attention to such duties and prohibitions and completely ignored the stringent 
penalties created by the [1967 Act].”  Id. at 9–10. 
162 TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 302.001 (West 2012). 
163 See USURY HANDBOOK, supra note 154, at 100 (“Section 303.201 of the Finance Code [license 
requirement] only comes into play . . . when the creditor is attempting to charge and interest rate higher 
than 10 percent per annum under the authority of Chapter 303 of the Finance Code [optional rate ceilings 
that exceed 10 percent].  Section 303.201 of the Finance Code does not remove the existing option of 
structuring any direct loan under the 10 percent per annum provision of Sec. 302.001 of the Finance Code 
or under some usury statute other than the Code, such as the corporate usury statute.”). 
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own regulations; consumer loans charging more than ten percent a year are regulated 
under Chapter 342.   
 Though total fees and interest on payday loans often amounts to more than ten 
percent of the cash advance, these products have never fit cleanly into Texas’s regulatory 
structure. As discussed in Part II.B.2(c), payday lenders in Texas currently register as 
credit service organizations (CSOs), which are technically considered brokers, not 
lenders and, as a result, are subject to fewer regulations than consumer lenders operating 
under Chapter 342.   
 
2. Texas’s Regulatory Structure Prior to 2004 
(a) Chapter 342 
 Though the consumer credit laws stemming from 1967’s H.B. 452 apply to a 
variety of loan products, the focus of this paper is small dollar consumer loans charging 
more than ten percent a year, a category of loans currently regulated by Chapter 342 of 
the Texas Finance Code.  Any loan that is not secured by real property, that “provides for 
interest in excess of 10 percent a year,” that “is extended primarily for personal, family, 
or household use,” and that is made by a “person engaged in the business of making, 
arranging, or negotiating [such loans]” is subject to Chapter 342.164  A “person” must be 
licensed by the OCCC to make, transact, or negotiate a loan that is subject to Chapter 
342.165   
 Subchapters E166 and F167 provide several options for structuring the interest and 
fees of consumer loans regulated by Chapter 342.  In general, the code regulates the 
                                                
164 TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 342.005 (West 2012).  
165 FIN. § 342.051. 
166 FIN. §§ 342.201-342.206. 
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interest that can be charged on applicable loans by establishing a series of interest rate 
“ceilings” that apply to certain portions (“brackets”) of the dollar amount of the cash 
advanced the consumer.  For example, one provision currently allows lenders to charge 
30 percent interest on the first $3,250 of the loan, 24 percent interest on the portion 
between $3,250 and $6,825, and 18 percent on the amount between $6,825 and $16,250, 
with $16,250 being maximum amount that can currently be lent under the provision.168  
Subchapter E allows larger amounts to be lent at rates above the usury cap but sets the 
maximum interest rate of only 30 percent a year.169  Subchapter F, by contrast, allows 
smaller amounts of money to be lent under its terms but permits lenders to charge fees 
that would add up to much higher annual percentage rates (APR), presumably based on 
the assumption that the loans are short term and so the fees will not typically be charged 
enough times to reach their theoretical APR.170 
 Both Subchapter E and F have their origins in H.B. 452 of 1967 and their 
differences relate largely to the ways in which they try to account for all the different 
product structures that lenders might devise.  As previously discussed, Subchapter E 
applies to larger dollar amounts and allows lower interest rates than does Subchapter F.  
Its rate ceiling provisions are also based on more conventional interest concepts, whereas 
Subchapter F appears more concerned with setting ceilings by translating fees charged 
per unit of cash advanced into annual percentage rates. 
                                                                                                                                            
167 FIN. §§ 342.251-242.259. 
168 FIN. § 342.201(e).  The boundaries of the brackets adjust over time based on statutory formulas that are 
reported by the OCCC.  See OFFICE OF CONSUMER CREDIT COMM’R, NOTICE OF RATE CEILINGS, 31 TEX. 
CREDIT LETTER no. 41, (April 10, 2012), available at 
http://occc.state.tx.us/pages/publications/ccl/2012/0410%20with%20Rate%20Bracket%20Adjustments_1.p
df [hereinafter NOTICE OF RATE CEILINGS]. 
169 FIN. § 342.201. 
170 FIN. §§ 342.251, 342.252, 342.259 (setting forth fee limits per unit of cash advanced per month). 
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 Subchapter E has different rules depending on (a) whether a loan has “regular” or 
“irregular” payment structure and (b) the method the lender wants to use for calculating 
interest and fees.  A “regular” loan is one that is repaid “in installments that are 
consecutive, monthly, and substantially equal in amount” and where the first payment is 
due within one month and 15 days from the date the loan is made.171  A loan is 
considered  “irregular” if it does not meet both the criteria for being  “regular.”172 
 Subchapter E also has different rules depending on whether the lender determines 
interest using  "add-on” or “simple interest” calculations173 and allows lenders to charge 
administrative fees of $20 to $25, depending on the amount of the loan.174  A lenders’ 
ability to charge additional administrative fees for refinancing is limited to once or twice 
a year, depending on the interest rate on the loan.175 Subchapter E also sets maximum 
terms for its loans based on the amount of cash advanced, with the maximum term being 
60 months for cash advances exceeding $3000.176   
Subchapter F provides for a different rate structure based on generally smaller 
loan amounts up to a maximum ceiling currently set at $1300.177  For cash advances of 
$100 to the current $1300 ceiling, a lender can charge an “acquisition” fee of not more 
                                                
171 FIN. § 342.001. 
172 Id. (defining a loan as irregular if either “payable in installments that are not consecutive, monthly, and 
substantially equal in amount” or “the first scheduled installment of which is due later than one month and 
15 days after the date of the loan.”). 
173 FIN. § 342.201; TEX. APPLESEED, supra note 12, at 77.  The “add-on” method of determining interest 
owed involves making an up-front calculation of the stated rate times the entire amount of principal 
advanced, ignoring the fact that if the borrower returns part of the principal with each payment the lender is 
not deprived of the full amount for the entire duration of the loan. For example, $1000 at 8 percent a year 
would yield $80 add-on interest during a 12 month repayment plan, which is ultimately 14.5 percent 
Annual Percentage Rate (APR) because the borrower returns about $83 of the principal each month, 
meaning the lender can make other uses of it.  Id. 
174 FIN. § 342.201(f); TEX. APPLESEED, supra note 12, at 77–78. 
175 FIN. § 342.201(f); TEX. APPLESEED, supra note 12, at 77–78. 
176 FIN. § 342.508. 
177 FIN. §§ 342.251, 342.259; NOTICE OF RATE CEILINGS, supra note 168. 
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than $10 and “an installment account handling charge” that does not exceed the “the ratio 
of $4 a month for each $100 of cash advance.”178  Variations on this fee structure are laid 
out for cash advances of less than $100.179  Subchapter F expressly prohibits lenders from 
charging or receiving fees not authorized in the subchapter180 and sets the maximum loan 
term at six months for cash advances of $100 or less and “one month for each multiple of 
$20 of cash advanced” for loans of more than $100.181 
In addition to abiding by interest rate restrictions, Subchapter E and F lenders 
have to apply for and satisfy the requirements for receiving a license from the OCCC,182 
which is obliged by statute to approve or deny a completed application within sixty 
calendar days of receiving a completed application or of holding a hearing on the 
application (if requested).183   Once a lender has been licensed, it must also comply with a 
variety of record-keeping, examination, and reporting requirements laid out in the Texas 
Administrative Code184 and pay annual fees, some of which are based on loan volume.185  
If a lender wishes to use computer software to maintain the required records and to 
process the loans it originates and services, that software must also be examined and 
approved by the state regulator as being able to satisfy the applicable rules regarding 
issues such as fee calculation and record keeping.186  
 
                                                
178 FIN. § 342.252.  The “acquisition charge” is considered earned by the lender at the time the loan is made 
and, thus, not subject to refund if the loan is paid off before the end of the term. FIN. § 342.256(a). 
179 FIN. § 342.252. 
180 FIN. § 342.254. 
181 FIN. § 342.255. 
182 FIN. § 342.051; 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 83.302 (2013). 
183 FIN. § 342.104(d); 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §83.307 (2013). 
184 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 83.826-83.838 (2013). 
185 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 83.310(g) (2013). 
186 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 83.831 (2013).  See also Regulated Loan Software Vendors, OFFICE OF 
CONSUMER CREDIT COMM’R, http://www.occc.state.tx.us/pages/industry/Reg_Loan/reg_vendors.htm (last 
visited Apr. 21, 2013). 
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(b) Non-Bank Lending and Chapter 342 
Payday lenders operating in Texas were essentially not regulated until late 2000 
when the Finance Commission of Texas approved a rule that expressly authorized 
“regulated lenders to engage in payday loans under the authority of Subchapter F” of the 
Finance Code.187  Before concluding that payday loan products fell “within the purview 
of Title 4 of [the Code],” the Finance Commission first had to find that (a) the cash 
advance and repayment model employed by payday lenders constituted a “loan” under 
the Code and (b) the charges associated with the advance were “interest or compensation 
for the use, forbearance, or detention of money.”188  Having done so, the Commission 
promulgated a rule to prescribe “the standards of conduct [to] be used to regulate and 
enforce [payday loan] transactions within the framework of Chapter 342.”189 To make its 
intentions clear, in the Texas Register entry proclaiming the new Texas Administrative 
Code Title 7, section 1.605, the Commission wrote that “the rule does not authorize a 
payday loan transaction outside the context of Subchapter F, Chapter 342 and is designed 
to pointedly address payday loans within the parameters of Subchapter F.”190 
The new rule defined what it called payday loans or “deferred presentment 
transactions”191 and declared that a person making such a loan with an effective annual 
                                                
187 TEX. SUBCOMM. ON CONSUMER CREDIT, supra note 85, at 12 (“At the time of the Subcommittee’s 
hearings [in April 2000], payday lenders operating in the Sate of Texas were doing so without regulatory 
oversight.”).  The Finance Commission of Texas adopted then- 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 1.605 Payday 
Loans, Deferred Presentment Transactions in the summer of 2000.  25 Tex. Reg. 6316 (June 30, 2000). The 
substance of this regulation can currently be found in 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 83.604 (2013). See Michael 
A. Garemko III, Texas’s New Payday Lending Regulations: Effective Debiasing Entails More Than the 
Right Message, 17 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 211, 226 n.90 (2012) (explaining how the rule moved through the 
legislative process of reorganizing the administrative code). 
188 25 Tex. Reg. 6316, 6317 (June 30, 2000). 
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 6319 (“A transaction in which a cash advance is made in exchange for the consumer's personal 
check, or in exchange for the consumer's authorization to debit the consumer's deposit account, in the 
amount of the advance plus a fee and where the parties agree that the check will not be cashed or deposited, 
or that the consumer's deposit account will not be debited, until a designated future date.”). 
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rate of more than ten percent had to be licensed by the OCCC.192  Under the rule, lenders 
would not be able to charge rates higher than those set out in Subchapter F193 and would 
have to make a variety of disclosures to borrowers in a written agreement.194  
Furthermore, the rule set absolute monthly rate caps, limiting the degree to which lenders 
could impose additional charges for renewals within the same month.195  For instance, if a 
borrower could not repay a $100 loan at the end of a two week term it could be renewed 
for another two weeks.  However, if the lender had initially charged the statutory 
maximum finance fee of $11.87 on the $100 loan, when it was renewed (effectively 
making the term four weeks) the lender could only charge an additional fee equivalent to 
the difference between the statutory maximum for a two-week term and that for a four- 
week term.196  For a $100 loan, the additional charge would only be $1.86 ($13.73 minus 
$11.87), not an additional $11.87.197  
 
(c) The Credit Service Organizations Act 
Despite the Finance Commission’s 2000 rule, the non-bank financial services 
industry in Texas has largely managed to bypass the Chapter 342.198  While it is true that 
payday loans are not specifically authorized outside the context of Subchapter F,199 the 
                                                
192 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 83.604(b) (2013). 
193 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 83.604(c) (2013). 
194 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 83.604(e) (2013). 
195 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 83.604(f)(1) (2013). 
196 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 83.604(c) (2013); TEX. SUBCOMM. ON CONSUMER CREDIT, supra note 85, at14. 
197 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 83.604(c) (2013) (see the rate schedule). 
198 See Deena Reynolds, A Look at Payday Loans & Current Regulation in Texas, 8 TEX. TECH. ADMIN. 
L.J. 321, 335–36 (2007). See also Ronald J. Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV. 
855, 884 (2007). Mann and Hawkins specifically discuss how Texas typifies a category of states that have 
formal usury laws but that do not explicitly define where payday loans fit into their regulatory structures, 
thus giving the industry opportunities to operate as it desires.  Id. at 877–78. 
199 See supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
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rules and regulatory actions have not specifically forced all cash advances that have the 
same effect as payday loans do on consumers under Chapter 342.200 What has happened 
is that, instead of becoming licensed lenders under Subchapter F, payday and other non-
bank lenders began to operate under a 1987 law called the Credit Services Organizations 
Act (CSOA).201  Though the law was originally passed to regulate credit repair 
businesses,202 it did not prohibit entities whose primary business was brokering loans (for 
a fee) from operating under it even if these businesses did not take steps to clean up 
customers’ credit records.  This oversight, which came to be known as “the CSO 
loophole,” provided an attractive way for small dollar lenders to bypass Chapter 342.203 
The CSOA regulates a class of business called “Credit Service Organizations” 
(CSO) that offer, among other things, the service of “obtain[ing] an extension of 
consumer credit for a consumer” in exchange for valuable consideration (i.e. money or a 
                                                
200 It is true that Texas Finance Code § 342.051(a) prohibits the use of “subterfuge” to evade application of 
the state’s usury laws but, as discussed Part II.B(3) infra, regulators and other interpreters of Texas law 
have not used this provision to force all alternative lenders under Chapter 342. 
201 “The CSOA was in former Chapter 18 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code, Acts 1987, 70th 
Leg., ch. 764, § 1 [and] became part of the Texas Finance Code.”  Lovick v. Ritemoney Ltd., 378 F.3d 433, 
442 (2004). 
202 S. Comm. Report, Credit Services Organization Act, H.B. 742, 70th Reg. Sess., at 1 (Tex. 1987), 
available at http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/scanned/srcBillAnalyses/70-0/HB742.pdf ("The federal Fair Credit 
Reporting Act [of 1970] entitles consumers who are denied credit based on a credit report the right to 
review and correct the contents oft their credit file at no charge.  Reportedly, consumers have paid 
extensive fees to companies to investigate their credit records.  There is a concern that consumers are 
misled by some operators who promise to solve their credit woes and clean up a bad credit history . . . As 
proposed, H.B. 742 regulates certain organizations that, with respect to the extension of credit by others, 
attempt to improve a consumer's credit history or to obtain an extension of credit for a consumer."); Ann 
Baddour, Commentary, Why Texas’ Small Dollar Lending Market Matters, E-PERSPECTIVES 12:2 (2012), 
http://www.dallasfed.org/microsites/cd/epersp/2012/2_2.cfm. 
203 URIAH KING ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, FINANCIAL QUICKSAND: PAYDAY LENDING SINKS 
BORROWERS IN DEBT WITH $4.2 BILLION IN PREDATORY FEES EVERY YEAR 17 (2006), available at 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/research-analysis/rr012-Financial_Quicksand-1106.pdf; 
J. Scott Sheehan, Memo, Payday Loan Bar Association – Update and Materials on CSO Model (Nov.13, 
2006), available at http://pdlba.com/images/GT_--_Payday_Loan_Bar_--_Update_on_CSO_Model_11-13-
06_.doc (laying out the legal case for using the CSO model for payday lending in light of recent 
developments in Texas law). 
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promise).204  The Texas law allows businesses meeting the definition of a CSO to charge 
“credit service fees” to their customers if they comply with statutory requirements.205 The 
version of the law in effect in the early 2000s required CSOs to register with the Texas 
Secretary of State206 and meet requirements such as paying a $100 fee,207 posting bond,208 
making certain disclosures to consumers,209 and giving customers notice of their right to 
cancel their contract within three days of signing.210  CSOs were not subject to licensing 
and reporting requirements.211  Without reporting requirements, there was no publically 
available data on Texas CSOs other than their names, addresses, and the identities of their 
major shareholders.212 
The model that payday lenders operating under the CSOA use bears a striking 
resemblance to the rent-a-bank model.  As described in Lovick v. Ritemoney, currently the 
controlling judicial interpretation of the law, the CSO model uses two entities: one that 
runs the store where borrowers seek loans and brokers the loan, and a second that actually 
originates the loan (i.e. the lender).213  A borrower taking out a loan through a CSO has 
separate contractual obligations to each entity.214  The borrower agrees to pay interest on 
                                                
204 TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 393.001(3)(B) (West 2006). 
205 Lovick v. Ritemoney Ltd., 378 F.3d 433, 442 (2004). 
206 FIN. § 393.101.  A registration statement under § 393.101 had to include the name and address of the 
CSO and major shareholders and information about litigation involving the organization.  Id.  In addition, 
the statute explicitly forbid the secretary of state from requiring a CSO “to provide information other than 
information contained in the registration statement.” Id.  The registration had to be renewed annually.  Id. 
207 FIN. § 393.104. 
208 FIN. § 393.401.  The bond would “be used to pay damages to the state or consumers in the event of a 
statutory violation.”  Garemko, supra note 187, at 229. 
209 FIN. § 393.105. 
210 FIN. § 393.202. 
211 Compare TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. Chap. 393 (West 2006) with TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. Chap. 393 (West 
2006 & Supp. 2012).  The 2011 Texas Legislature added Subchapter G to Chapter 393, which, among other 
things requires licensing for CSOs and quarterly reports regarding lending activities.  Acts 2011, 82nd Leg. 
ch. 1302 (H.B. 2594), §2. 
212 This is information that was required in the disclosures prior to 2011.  FIN. § 393.105. 
213 Lovick v. Ritemoney Ltd., 378 F.3d 433, 436 (2004). 
214 Id. at 437. 
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the loan at a rate not to exceed 10 percent a year to the actual lender, which is regulated 
by Texas’s usury cap.215  However, the borrower also agrees to pay fees to the other 
entity, the Credit Service Organization (CSO), for the separate service of arranging 
(brokering) the loan.216  The borrower signs a document acknowledging that the broker’s 
fees were “not interest for the purposes of Texas law.”217  Because the CSO does not 
operate as a “lender” under the usury law or Chapter 342, there is no limit on the number 
or magnitude of fees that it can charge to the borrower.   
 
3.  Lovick v. Ritemoney 
In 2004 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a decision in Lovick v. 
Ritemoney, Ltd. that blessed the dual party (CSO-lender) business model that allows non-
bank lenders to offer small-dollar, short term loans in Texas outside of Chapter 342 rate 
restrictions. 
(a) The Case 
In Lovick a borrower had sued a credit service organization (CSO) that acted as a 
broker for loans legally originated by a lender called “Ritemoney, Ltd.”218  The suit was 
filed in federal court under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act (RICO), but was predicated on a sub-claim that the CSO was systematically violating 
Texas’s 10 percent usury cap.219  The plaintiff argued that the arrangement violated Texas 
law because the CSO’s broker’s fee was actually attributable to the lender—that it was 
“disguised interest”—and that the combination of actual interest and fees exceeded 10 
                                                
215 Id. 
216 Id. 
217 Id. (citing a clause in the contract signed by the plaintiff-borrower). 
218 Id. at 436. 
219 Id. at 437. 
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percent of the principal.220  The lower court granted the lender-defendant’s motion to 
dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiff had not stated a RICO claim because they had 
not sufficiently alleged a violation of the state usury law.221 The Fifth Circuit affirmed.222 
At the crux of the Fifth Circuit’s decision (and now of the legitimacy of the CSO-
payday model) is a legal distinction between “interest” (compensation “for the use, 
forbearance, or detention of money”223) and the fees offered in exchange for additional 
services, such as acting as an intermediary to broker a loan between a borrower and 
lender.  In the court’s analysis, fees may constitute “disguised interest” (and therefore 
usurious) only if they are not offered in exchange for a service other than the lending of 
the money.224 
 According to the Fifth Circuit’s analysis, Texas law distinguishes between two 
types of entities: CSOs (which broker credit for their customers in exchange for 
consideration)225 and actual lenders.  According to the court, “Texas’ usury statutes 
regulate lenders . . . differentiat[ing] between loans charging interest rates of ten percent 
or less, which are unregulated, and those charging more than ten percent.”226  On the 
other hand, the court said, the Credit Services Organization Act (CSOA) regulates 
CSOs.227  According to the court, these two laws “work in harmony, permitting a CSO to 
charge a brokerage fee in connection with its services”228 and, because “the Texas 
Legislature ha[d] not restricted the amount of a CSO service fee in proportion to the 
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222 Id. at 444. 
223 TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 301.002(a)(4) (West 2012). 
224 Lovick, 378 F.3d at 439. 
225 Id. at 442. 
226 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
227 “CSOA was in former Chapter 18 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code, Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 
764, § 1 [and] became part of the Texas Finance Code.”  Id. at 442. 
228 Id. at 442-43 (citing TEX. FIN. CODE § 393.303 (2004). 
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services provided” the Fifth Circuit did not think it appropriate that the court substitute its 
own judgment for that of the legislature and set a cap.229  As the court went on to explain, 
the broker-defendant was a valid CSO under the finance code230 and was allowed to 
collect the disputed fees and it was legal not to consider those fees attributable to the 
lender for the purpose of the usury law.  Lovick thus blessed the CSO “loophole” and cut 
off the legal debate as to whether payday lenders’ service charges were actually interest 
for usury purposes. 
 
(b) What it wrought 
The presence of payday and auto-title lenders had grown dramatically in Texas 
during the late 1990s and 2000s as regulations relaxed and banks took advantage of rate 
importation.231  Initially the growing industry used the rent-a-bank model to take 
advantage of the higher interest rates that some non-Texas banks were allowed to 
charge.232 In 2005, however, the FDIC started taking steps that made the rent-a-bank 
model unattractive for regulated depositories.233 The confluence of the Ritemoney 
decision blessing the CSO-brokered loan model and the FDIC’s decision to reign in the 
rent-a-bank model led to the CSO becoming the dominant business form for alternative 
lenders in Texas.234 A review of OCCC annual reports regarding licensed lenders 
between 2005 and 2010 illustrates the trend. 
                                                
229 Lovick, 378 F.3d at 443. 
230 Id. at 442. 
231 See TEX. APPLESEED, supra note 12, at 7 (citing data about payday lending growth in Texas during the 
first decade of the twenty-first century). 
232 See Lawrence Meyers, Payday Lenders Strike Back, THE MOTLEY FOOL (July 29, 2005) available at 
http://www.fool.com/investing/small-cap/2005/07/29/payday-lenders-strike-back.aspx (discussing how the 
FDIC’s move to limit state bank rate importation helped push lenders in Texas to exploit the CSO 
loophole). 
233 See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text. 
234 See supra note 203 and accompanying text.   
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In 2005, Subchapter F lenders brokered 1,633,805 payday loans worth 
$644,775,840 (presumably using the rent-a-bank model).235  By 2007 there were no 
Subchapter F brokered payday loans in Texas.236  Furthermore, between 2005 and 2010 
the number of Subchapter F payday loans made (as opposed to brokered) dropped from 
488,448 in 2005 to 7,316 in 2010, a 98 percent reduction.237 In 2012, the first year that 
CSOs were required to report data to the OCCC, they made 4,118,322 payday and auto 
title loans.238  During that year, borrowers paid fees of $1,243,084,205 on those loans.239 
 In stark contrast to Chapter 342 and related OCCC regulations, pre-2011 Chapter 
393 required very little of CSOs other than that they register and pay a small fee to the 
state. There were no record-keeping or examination requirements related to items such as 
the number and amount of loans originated and default rates, nor were there consumer 
protection requirements regarding issues such as notice of default, timely release of liens, 
or the like.240  Without the type of reporting requirements to which Chapter 342 lenders 
have been subject, it was almost impossible to track data on the industry other than the 
                                                
235 OFFICE OF CONSUMER CREDIT COMM’R, REGULATED LENDER CONSOLIDATED VOLUME REPORT (2005), 
http://www.occc.state.tx.us/pages/publications/consolidated_reports/Regulated%20Lender%202005.pdf 
236 OFFICE OF CONSUMER CREDIT COMM’R, REGULATED LENDER CONSOLIDATED VOLUME REPORT (2007), 
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237 Compare OFFICE OF CONSUMER CREDIT COMM’R, REGULATED LENDER CONSOLIDATED VOLUME 
REPORT (2010) with OFFICE OF CONSUMER CREDIT COMM’R, REGULATED LENDER CONSOLIDATED 
VOLUME REPORT (2005), http://www.occc.state.tx.us/pages/publications/index.html (follow links for 
Regulated Lender reports at bottom right of page). 
238 TEX. IMPACT, CONSUMER IMPACTS OF CREDIT SERVICES SENATE BILL 1247, available at 
http://texasimpact.org/sites/default/files/Consumer%20Impact%20Analysis.pdf (data on the total number of 
deferred presentment loans and title loans—both single payment and installment—made in 2012 compiled 
from reports made by CSOs to the OCCC, which are available at 
http://www.occc.state.tx.us/pages/publications/index.html). 
239 TEX. IMPACT, supra note 238 (“Total Amount of fees paid by Texas Consumers”). 
240 See supra notes 206-212 and accompanying text. 
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volume of CSO registrations.241  As a result, while the numbers of CSOs grew and the 
anecdotes about adverse customer outcomes seemed to proliferate,242 it was hard to paint 
an accurate picture of the industry in Texas or engage in studies to explore issues such as 
whether high concentrations of welfare and food stamp use in a particular area were 
associated with an increased presence or use of alternative lending products. 
 
  
                                                
241 See TEX. APPLESEED, supra note 12, at 10 (describing the changes to CSO regulation caused by the 
2011 bills and how they will increase public information available about these businesses). 
242 See TEX. APPLESEED, supra note 12, at 7, 13-16, 21-22 (providing statistics on industry growth in Texas 
between 2004 and 2010 and evidence from anecdotes and limited surveys about customer experiences). 
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Part III.  Post-Financial Crisis Developments 
The 2008-2009 financial crisis brought subprime lending into the national 
spotlight and spurred calls for increased regulation of the alternative lending industry.  A 
full account of the legislative battles that led to new regulations in Texas and to the 
passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 is 
beyond the scope of this paper.  These statutes did, however, create noticeable changes 
for CSOs in Texas and for the purveyors of non-bank financial services around the 
country. 
 
A.  CHANGES TO TEXAS STATE LAW 
Following Lovick v. Ritemoney in 2004, it became clear that legal challenges to 
the CSO model were not the way to increase regulation of non-bank lenders in Texas.  In 
the wake of the 2008-2009 recession and revelations about the role that sub-prime 
lending played in causing the economic crash, however, consumer advocates found the 
momentum to make regulation of CSOs, and therefore payday lending, an issue in the 
2011 Texas legislative session.  As had occurred in previous sessions, consumer 
advocates proposed a bill that would have overturned Lovick by amending the Finance 
Code to prevent CSOs from charging fees to broker credit from third parties, a 
cornerstone of the CSO model for payday lending.243  That bill never made it out of 
committee but after substantial negotiation between consumer advocates and 
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representatives of the non-bank lending industry,244 the Texas legislature passed two 
bills—H.B. 2592 and H.B. 2594—that increase regulation of payday lending in Texas.245  
The bills that eventually passed imposed more strict licensing and disclosure 
requirements on CSOs than had previously existed246 but they did not rewrite the CSOA 
to prevent loan brokers from registering under the law (i.e. “close the CSO loophole”).247  
The efficacy of the disclosure requirements will largely be dictated by how they are 
implemented by the OCCC.248  Licensing was especially important because, prior to the 
2011 law, there was almost no mechanism in place through which to monitor the 
activities of CSOs. As is apparent from the 2012 CSO data discussed above, licensing 
requirements produced data reporting that will give regulators and scholars a better 
picture of what CSOs are doing in the marketplace. 
There was other proposed legislation that never made it out of committee that 
would have “closed the loophole” by preventing CSOs from acting as brokers for 
extensions of credit from third party lenders.249  House Bill 410, offered by 
Representatives Tom Craddick and Eddie Rodriguez, would also have made it clear that 
credit service fees charged under the CSOA should be considered interest for the purpose 
                                                
244 See id. at 231-42 (detailing three of the bills on credit service organizations filed during the 2011 
session and the legislative process that produced the two bills that eventually passed and were signed into 
law).   
245 Act of May 23, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 1301, 2011 TEX. GEN. LAWS 3717 (codified at TEX. FIN. CODE 
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the passage of the bills). 
249 Id. at 231 (citing Tex. H.B. 410, 82d Leg., R.S. (2011)). 
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of determining whether a business was complying with usury law.250  Such a change 
would have overturned the logic of Lovick, which relied heavily on the premise that 
CSOs collect fees for service, which do not qualify as “interest” for the purpose of 
determining whether the lender-partner violated lending laws.251 
A new bill aimed at further regulating CSOs was introduced during the 2013 
legislative session but it is uncertain whether it will have enough support to become 
law.252 
 
B.  DEVELOPMENTS AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL 
Developments at the federal level since the financial crisis of 2008 are likely to 
affect the world in which alternative financial service providers operate. Though a full 
survey of these developments is beyond the scope of this paper, two that are of particular 
importance are discussed in this section.  First, the FDIC has increasingly been 
encouraging depository institutions to provide small-dollar lending products on terms that 
it deems “affordable” for borrowers who do not qualify for prime credit products.  
Though it is unclear how wide an impact the FDIC’s efforts will have, the results of a 
pilot program it initiated in 2008 may provide the evidence that depository institutions 
need to encourage them to experiment with affordable small-dollar loans.  Second, and 
perhaps most important, is passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
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252 See Emily Mathis, Hot List: Day 105 of the Legislature, TEXAS OBSERVER (Monday, April 22, 2013, at 
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Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank).253  Much of the Act focused on the practices of 
financial institutions related to the derivative and mortgage markets that were blamed for 
creating the financial crisis254 but the Act also has important provisions regarding 
consumer finance,255 including the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(CFPB).256 
 
1. FDIC Small-Dollar Loan Pilot Program 
In February of 2008, the FDIC began a pilot program “designed to illustrate how 
banks can profitably offer affordable small-dollar loans as an alternative to high-cost 
credit products, such as payday loans.”257  The agency selected 31 depository institutions, 
many of which were community banks,258 to participate in the two-year pilot.259 
Applicant banks had to meet certain safety and soundness requirements and propose a 
small-dollar loan program that was “generally consistent with the . . . Small-Dollar Loan 
                                                
253 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (July 21, 2010) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
254 See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER 
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placed restrictions on the preemption powers of federal banking regulators such as the OCC, “expan[ding] 
enforcement authority of state attorneys general and banking regulators,” and expanding remedies available 
under TILA. CONSUMER CREDIT REGULATION, supra note 25, at 9-10.  The preemption issue is less 
relevant for non-depository lending regulation now because all consumer protection has been consolidated 
in the CFPB.  DODD-FRANK SUMMARY, supra note 254, at 11.  
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258 Id. at 32. 
259 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., Introduction to the FDIC’s Small-Dollar Loan Pilot Program, 2 FDIC Q., no. 
3, 2008, at 23-24, available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/ 
quarterly/2008_vol2_3/2008_Quarterly_Vol2No3.html [hereinafter FDIC Pilot Introduction].   
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Guidelines” issued by the FDIC in June 2007.260  After close to two years of participating 
in the pilot “[a]lmost all of the pilot bankers indicated that [they found] small-dollar 
lending [to be] a useful business strategy and that they [would] continue their . . . 
programs beyond the pilot.”261  Highlights of the pilot’s outcomes and lessons are as 
follows.  
Between the second quarter of 2008 and the fourth quarter of 2009, the 
“participating banks made more than 18,100 [small-dollar loans],” defined as loans of 
$1,000 or less, “with a principal balance of $12.4 million and almost 16,300 [loans 
between $1,000 and $2,500] with a principal balance of nearly $27.8 million.”262  The 
delinquency rate for the small-dollar loans was around 9 percent for much of 2009, 
though it climbed to 11 percent in the fourth quarter.263  The rate for the $1,000-$2,500 
fluctuated between 6.4 and 10.9 percent during 2009.264  These delinquency rates were 
much higher than the roughly 2.5 percent rate for “general unsecured loans to 
individuals.”265  However, “charge-off ratios” (i.e. default rates) for both classes of pilot 
program loans (around 5-6 percent) were in keeping with the industry averages for 
defaults on unsecured credit.266   
                                                
260 Id. The FDIC’s Small-Dollar Loan Guidelines, issued on June 19, 2007, can be found at 
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It is important to remember that the FDIC pilot was conducted in 2008 and 2009, 
during the height of the economic crisis, and that small-dollar loan consumers would not 
typically be using the high-cost products if their economic situations afforded them 
access to alternative sources of cash or lower borrowing rates.  In that context, it is 
possible that the pilot program had higher delinquency rates (which reflect late payments, 
not defaults) than general, unsecured loans during the same period because the economic 
crisis hit people of lesser economic means more severely than it did the general 
population.267  The fact that the percentage of loans actually “charged-off” (i.e. counted 
as a loss by lenders because repayment was deemed unlikely) was roughly the same in 
the pilot as in the general population, however, suggests that pilot borrowers were no 
more likely to actually default than other borrowers who may have stronger credit 
histories and more stable financial situations.  It is also in keeping with one of the most 
important lessons learned from the pilot program: “a longer loan term is key to [small-
dollar lending] success because it provides more time for consumers to recover from a 
financial emergency than the single pay cycle for payday loans.”268 
Ultimately, the pilot bankers’ positive attitude about their small dollar loan 
programs seemed to have less to do with their profitability than with their utility as a tool 
with which to build relationships with borrowers who might ultimately purchase other 
banking services.269  More specifically, most of the bankers “indicated that costs related 
to launching and marketing [the] programs and originating and servicing small-dollar 
loans are similar to other loans.”270  However, “the small size of [the loans]” tended not 
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to generate interest and fees “sufficient to achieve robust short-term profitability.”271  
Many of the bankers seemed to recognize, however, that offering small-dollar loans that 
previously underbanked customers might use in lieu of payday loans, however, might 
allow the bank to develop relationships with new customers to whom they might “cross-
sell additional [financial] products.”272 
The participants’ lending models varied but their experiences allowed the FDIC to 
identify some of the “essential product design and delivery elements for safe, affordable, 
and feasible small-dollar loans that [could] be replicated by other banks.”273  The 
resulting template had the following features: (1) a loan amount of $2,500 or less, (2) a 
term of 90 days or more, (3) an APR of 36 percent or less, (4) low or no origination or 
other upfront fees and never fees which, combined with interest, raised the APR above 36 
percent, (5) streamlined underwriting to reduce lender costs and offer quick application-
to-origination turn-around for borrowers, and (6) optional (for bankers) mandatory saving 
and financial education for borrowers.274  Furthermore, recognizing that increased 
profitability will likely make small-dollar loan programs more appealing to a wider 
variety of banks, the FDIC report on the pilot also suggested ways for lenders to reduce 
costs through techniques such as electronic withdrawal payments and employer-based 
lending.275 
It is possible that the results of the FDIC pilot will convince other depository 
lenders to offer affordable small-dollar products.  As is discussed in the next section, 
some scholars have argued that a resurgence of bank-based small-dollar lending will fill 
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the void if the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau passes regulations that reduce the 
profitability of the contemporary non-bank small-dollar loan model.  Given the relatively 
limited scope of the FDIC pilot, however, particularly the fact that it was largely limited 
to community banks with supportive management, it is unclear whether the model can 
take hold on a national scale at the scope of the current non-bank financial services 
sector. 
 
 2.  The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
The CFPB, created by Title X of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), has been charged with “implement[ing] and, where 
applicable, enforce[ing] Federal consumer financial law consistently for the purpose of 
ensuring [1] that all consumers have access to markets for consumer financial products 
and services and [2] that markets for consumer financial products and services are fair, 
transparent, and competitive.”276  To carry out its statutory purpose, the CFPB was given 
both rule-writing and enforcement powers but was banned from instituting a federal 
usury cap for consumer loans.277  In general, the CFPB was given the power to “prescribe 
rules and issue orders and guidance, as may be necessary or appropriate to enable the 
Bureau to administer and carry out the purposes and objectives of the Federal consumer 
financial laws, and to prevent evasions [of those laws].”278  This provision transferred 
rule-writing authority for several federal rules—including TILA279 and ECOA280—to the 
CFPB from the agencies originally in charge of them.  In addition to taking over rule-
                                                
276 12 U.S.C. §5511(a) (Supp. 2012) 
277 12 U.S.C. § 5517(o). 
278 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(1). 
279 12 U.S.C. § 5581(12)(O) 
280 12 U.S.C. § 5581(12)(D) 
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writing for existing consumer financial protection laws, the CFPB was given the specific 
power of writing rules prohibiting unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts and practices 
(UDAAP) by the lenders over which it has enforcement power.281 
The ability of the CFPB to enforce the rules it writes and to examine regulated 
entities (i.e. go in and examine books, etc.) is dictated by the type of institution.  The 
CFPB has exclusive examination and primary enforcement power over depository 
institutions with assets in excess of $10 million (large financial institutions).282  It has the 
same powers over “covered” non-depository lenders that (among other things) offer 
payday loans.283  This means that the CFPB should have examination and enforcement 
power over CSOs in Texas offering payday and auto title loans.  The rules that the CFPB 
writes still apply to depository institutions with less than $10 million in assets but “the 
CFPB has the authority only to accompany prudential regulators on examinations” of 
these smaller banks.284  
Of the powers granted to the CFPB, its authority to write and enforce rules 
regarding unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts and practices (UDAAP) has the most 
potential to impact the small-dollar lending industry.  As scholar Creola Johnson has 
recently written, though the CFPB does not have the power to institute a federal usury 
cap, by writing rules that bring practices commonly associated with payday lending under 
                                                
281 12 U.S.C. § 5531(b) (“The Bureau may prescribe rules applicable to a covered person or service 
provider identifying as unlawful unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices in connection with any 
transaction with a consumer for a consumer financial product or service, or the offering of a consumer 
financial product or service. Rules under this section may include requirements for the purpose of 
preventing such acts or practices.”). 
282 Johnson, supra note 12, at 411 n.208 (citing 12 U.S.C § 5515).  
283 12 U.S.C § 5514. 
284 Johnson, supra note 12, at 411. 
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the UDAAP ban, federal law could make it difficult for abusive small-dollar lenders to 
operate legally.285   
Under Dodd-Frank, the CFPB can find an act or practice to be “unfair” if it (A) 
“causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably 
avoidable by consumers” and (B) if that “injury is not outweighed by countervailing 
benefits to consumers or to competition.”286  Johnson argues that research has found 
“substantial injury” to payday consumers caused by common practices such as “high 
interest rates, short maturity dates, single balloon payments, multiple rollover and 
refinancing fees, and repetitive electronic bank-account access.”287  This injury should 
qualify as “not reasonably avoidable,” Johnson argues, because payday borrowers 
frequently have limited knowledge of and access to less costly credit products and, at the 
time they enter payday contracts, they have no reason to anticipate that lenders will 
engage in practices such as repeatedly debiting bank accounts for financing fees in ways 
that build up insufficient funds charges.288  If some or all of these practices are found to 
be “unfair” by the CFPB, Johnson argues that they should be banned or restricted through 
mechanisms such at placing limits on back-to-back loans, establishing minimum maturity 
periods, and requiring installment (rather than balloon) payments.289 
                                                
285 Id. at 415. 
286 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c) (“In determining whether an act or practice is unfair, the Bureau may consider 
established public policies as evidence to be considered with all other evidence. Such public policy 
considerations may not serve as a primary basis for such determination.”). 
287 Johnson, supra note 12, at 415. 
288 Id. at 417-18.   Johnson bases her argument on the “unavoidable” standard applied by the FTC and 
courts applying FTC rules related to unfair practices in the context of non-financial consumer products.  
The FTC definition of “unfair” is essentially the same as the one in Dodd-Frank.  Compare 15 U.S.C. § 
45(n), with 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c). 
289 Johnson, supra note 12, at 422. 
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Dodd-Frank does not define “deceptive” for the purpose of the UDAAP powers it 
gives the CFPB.290  Johnson argues that, because Dodd-Frank adopted the definition of 
“unfair” that has been used by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to enforce similar 
rules in the context of other consumer products, the CFPB should also look to the FTC’s 
interpretations of the term “deceptive.”291  One articulation of the FTC’s interpretation of 
“deceptive act” is “a representation, omission, or practice, . . . that is likely to mislead 
consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances, and . . . the representation, 
omission, or practice is material.”292  Among other things, Johnson argues that practices 
such as offering roll-overs, refinancing fees, and back-to-back loans should qualify as 
“deceptive” because many borrowers who have accumulated substantial fees in 
connection with these products did not understand at the time of the initial contract that a 
large portion of the fees they paid would not reduce the principal of their loans and that it 
would thus be expensive to pay off these loans over time.293   
Finally, the CFPB has two options for finding that a practice is “abusive” when 
connected with the offering of a consumer financial product or service.  To find that an 
act or practice is “abusive,” the CFPB must determine that it either “materially interferes 
with the ability of a consumer to understand a term or condition of a consumer financial 
product or service;” or that the act or practice 
 
takes unreasonable advantage of (A) a lack of understanding on the part of 
the consumer of the material risks, costs, or conditions of the product or 
service; (B) the inability of the consumer to protect the interests of the 
                                                
290 Id. at 423; see also 12 U.S.C. § 5531 (providing standards for finding unfair and abusive acts but not 
deceptive ones).  
291 Johnson, supra note 12, at 423. 
292 Id. (quoting Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 164-65 (1984) (citing FTC Policy Statement on 
Deception from James C. Miller III, Chairman, FTC, to Rep. Dingell, Chairman, Comm. on Energy & 
Commerce, House of Representatives (Oct. 14, 1983), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-
decept.htm)). 
293 Johnson, supra note 12, at 423-24. 
 60 
consumer in selecting or using a consumer financial product or service; or 
(C) the reasonable reliance by the consumer on a covered person to act in 
the interests of the consumer.294 
Johnson argues that this definition of “abusive” should cover both the typical payday 
practices that she discussed in the context of unfair and deceptive bans and the practice of 
“failing to assess the borrower’s ability to repay” the loans before originating them.295  If 
the CFPB promulgates rules under its unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices 
powers that would be violated by typical payday lending practices, these practices could 
be prevented as unlawful on both the state and federal levels.296 
 
C.  WHAT WILL IT ALL MEAN? 
It is too soon to tell what the effect will be for non-bank lenders around the 
country of the FDIC’s attempts to encourage banks to offer small-dollar loans and of the 
CFPB’s new powers.  At least in Texas, it appears likely that the current model, where 
the CSO charges relatively high fees to broker a loan between the borrower and a bank 
that charges 10 percent annual interest on the actual loan, is here to stay.  Having 
acknowledged that fact, however, a variety of non-profit-maximizing organizations are 
experimenting with lending models that attempt to provide short-term, small-dollar loans 
at annual percentage rates (APR) far below 100 percent.297 One such organization 
                                                
294 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d) 
295 Johnson, supra note 12, at 425. 
296 See CONSUMER CREDIT REGULATION, supra note 25, at 31 (explaining that Dodd-Frank—12 U.S.C. § 
5536(a)(1)(A)—makes it unlawful to offer a product that is not in conformity with federal consumer 
financial law, and that such illegality may allow consumers of such products to void the contracts under 
state law). 
297 See TEX. APPLESEED, supra note 12, at 45-61 (profiling six Texas organizations that are offering “loan 
products that make a difference).  This is similar to what a man named Martin Eakes did with sub-prime 
mortgage lending in North Carolina in the 1980’s and ‘90’s, some of these groups are attempting to show 
that it is possible to operate sustainable, non-charitable businesses providing credit to sub-prime borrowers 
without charging the fees that have made payday lenders so much money in the last twenty years.  RIVLIN, 
supra note 72, at 85-103. 
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operating out of Brownsville, Texas has been piloting a model where the lender partners 
with local employers and is able to offer a small-dollar loan at about 22 percent APR by 
reducing overhead and underwriting costs.  The experience of this organization, the Rio 




Part IV.  Working Within the System: The Rio Grande Valley 
Multibank’s Small-Dollar Loan Program298 
The Rio Grande Valley Community Loan Center (CLC) is a wholly-owned, for-
profit subsidiary of an entity called the Rio Grande Valley Multibank (the Multibank).299  
The Multibank was founded in 1995 with the mission “to improve the economic 
conditions of people in the Rio Grande Valley [in Texas] through the cooperative efforts 
of [its] investment partner shareholder institutions.”300 The Multibank is a Community 
Development Financial Institution (CDFI),301 which allows it to access certain federal 
funds designated for community development purposes.302  Furthermore, other financial 
institutions that are subject to Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) examination can get 
                                                
298 In addition to the publicly available sources cited, the information in this section is the product of 
personal communications with the managers and contractors of the CLC during the Fall of 2012 and 
Winter/Spring of 2013.  Nick Mitchell-Bennett, the Executive Director of the Community Development 
Corporation of Brownsville, TX (which operates the CLC for the Multibank) gave presentations on the 
CLC at the Texas Community Economic Development Policy Summit at the Texas State Capitol on 
October 4, 2012 and at the office of the Texas Association of Community Development Corporations on 
February 20, 2013.  In addition to the information gleaned from these presentations, this author has had 
personal correspondence with Mr. Mitchell-Bennett and with Eva Woodfin, the CLC’s Small Dollar Loan 
Coordinator.  Both Mr. Mitchell-Bennett and Ms. Woodfin work at and can be reached at 901 E. Levee 
Street Brownsville Texas, 78520; 956-541-4955. 
299 TEX. APPLESEED, supra note 12, at 49; The Community Loan Center, RGV CMTY. LOAN CTR., 
http://rgvcommunityloancenter.com/tclcgrn.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2013). 
300 Id.  The Multibank started with “six investing stockholder banks covering the investment area of 
Cameron County” and has since expanded its investment area to include Hidalgo, Starr, and Willacy 
Counties in March 2001” with three additional equity investor banks. Id. 
301 TEX. APPLESEED, supra note 12, at 49.   
302 “CDFI certification is a designation conferred by the CDFI Fund and is a requirement for accessing 
financial and technical award assistance from the CDFI Fund through the CDFI Program, Native American 
CDFI Assistance Program, and certain benefits under the [Bank Enterprise Award] Program to support an 
organization's established community development financing programs.” Community Development 
Financial Institution Fund, CDFI FUND, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
http://www.cdfifund.gov/what_we_do/programs_id.asp?programID=9.  There are currently approximately 
1000 certified CDFIs in the United States.  Id. (listed on “List of Certified CDFIs with Recertification 
Application Due Dates” under “Supplemental Resources” at the bottom of the page). 
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credit for investing in CDFIs, which makes it easier for institutions with CDFI 
certification to access affordable capital.303 
In the late 2000s the members of the Brownsville public service community 
determined that a shortage of reasonably priced small-dollar loans was having a negative 
impact on area residents.304  In the terms used in the 2011 FDIC survey discussed above, 
most of the affected residents were largely “underbanked” in that they had basic accounts 
but were turning to alternative lending institutions (such as payday and title lenders) 
because, “due to credit problems or other barriers, they often [could not] access bank 
loans.”305  To address this need the Multibank began researching the feasibility of 
launching its own small-dollar lending program and, in September 2010, incorporated the 
Community Loan Center (CLC) to operate the loan program.306  The CLC started making 
loans in October of 2011.307 
A.  GETTING STARTED 
In addition to keeping a relatively low APR for borrowers, two of the primary 
considerations in the development of the CLC’s program were (a) to build a model that 
would ultimately be sustainable, i.e. that could cover its overhead with interest and 
                                                
303 See Community Reinvestment Act, Interagency Questions and Answers Regarding Community 
Reinvestment, Notice, 75 Fed. Reg. 11642, 11648 (March 11, 2010) (advising that making loans to 
financial intermediaries such as CDFIs qualifies as making “community development loans” for the 
purpose of the CRA). See also Community Reinvestment Act: Background & Purpose, FED. FIN. INST. 
EXAMINATION COUNCIL, http://www.ffiec.gov/cra/history.htm (providing an overview of the CRA)(last 
visited Apr. 22, 2013). 
304 TEX. APPLESEED, supra note 12, at 49. 
305 Id. at 50. 
306 KEVIN JEWELL, LAUNCHING A SMALL DOLLAR LOAN PROGRAM: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE RIO GRANDE 
VALLEY MULTIBANK’S COMMUNITY LOAN CENTER 2 (2012) (on file with author).  The CLC’s Articles of 
Incorporation were originally filed on August 26, 2010 under the name “Consumer Loan Center” but had to 
be amended to change the name to “Community Loan Center.”  The Certificate of Correction reflecting the 
desired name was filed on September 1, 2010.  The Articles of Incorporation and Certificate of Correction 
are on file with the author and are available through the Texas Secretary of State. 
307 Id. at 2. 
 64 
service fees and replenish lending capital through repayment of loans,308 and (b) the 
desire to operate as a regulated lender under Chapter 342, rather than as a CSO under 
Chapter 393.309  To achieve sustainability under the stricter regulation of Chapter 342 the 
CLC had to address two of the main issues that have long plagued small-dollar lenders.  
First, the per-dollar origination and servicing costs are higher the smaller the dollar value 
of a loan’s principal.310 This is because, while the gross administrative costs associated 
with originating and servicing an individual loan (employee salaries, office overhead, 
etc.) remain relatively constant regardless of the loan size, the per-dollar cost goes up for 
smaller loans because they yield less revenue in the form of interest payments before 
being retired.  A second issue is that many consumers of small-dollar loans use the 
product because they do not have the credit necessary to access mainstream borrowing 
options such as credit cards.  Such borrowers often have heightened risk profiles, forcing 
lenders to prepare for higher losses than they would when serving borrowers with better 
credit histories.311 
Payday and auto title lenders have addressed these issues by charging fees that put 
the effective APR of their small-dollar loan in the triple digits312 but the CLC was 
committed to keeping its loans “affordable,” causing it to create a more conventional 
                                                
308 Personal communication with Nick Mitchell-Bennett. 
309 See JEWELL supra note 306, at 3 (discussing Multibank’s decision not to use the “CSO loophole” 
because “it is widely viewed as a misuse of the original intent of the CSO statute.”). 
310 FDIC Small-Dollar Pilot, supra note 53, at 32.  See also JEWELL, supra note 306, at 4 (“Higher loan 
balances have lower per-dollar origination and servicing costs”).  Cf. 2011 FDIC Survey, supra note 91 at 7 
(about a quarter of banks surveyed about barriers to providing small dollar loan products for the unbanked 
and underbanked reported concerns about profitability). 
311 See FDIC Small-Dollar Pilot, supra note 53. 
312 CFPB MANUAL, supra note 18, at Short-Term, Small-Dollar Lending Procedures 2; but see Myth vs. 
Reality: Payday lenders’ high fees help the industry make billions in profits, CMTY. FIN. SERV. ASS’N OF 
AM., http://cfsaa.com/aboutthepaydayindustry/myth-vs-reality.aspx (last visited Apr. 20, 2013) (arguing 
that APR is not an appropriate measure of payday lending fees because the loans are short-term).  
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product with an APR well under the 36 percent recommended by the FDIC.313  In 
developing its program, the CLC researched existing low-cost small dollar loan 
programs314 such as the “Salary Advance Loan” offered by the North Carolina State 
Employees’ Credit Union (NCSECU)315 and the “Save it!” loan developed by the 
Mountain Association for Community Economic Development (MACED) in Eastern 
Kentucky.316  The experience of MACED was particularly instructive because it provided 
an example of a non-depository institution that had offered loans through partnerships 
with local employers and conducted an analysis of the economic realities of running such 
a program.317 
The CLC’s research lead them to the conclusion that they would have to 
drastically minimize overhead and servicing costs in order to offer small-dollar loans 
within the parameters of Chapter 342 without requiring long-term subsidies to cover 
administration of the program.  The NCSECU and MACED loan program experiences 
demonstrated that administrative costs could be reduced by limiting the need to have 
                                                
313 The FDIC’s Small-Dollar Loan Guidelines, issued on June 19, 2007, can be found at 
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2007/pr07052a.html. 
314 JEWELL, supra note 306, at 3 
315 Salary Advance Loan, N.C. STATE EMP. CREDIT UNION,  
https://www.ncsecu.org/personalloans/salaryadvance.html (last visited April 8, 2013).  The Salary Advance 
Loan is paid by electronic fund transfer from the borrower’s credit union account at the subsequent pay 
day.  Id.  Rates are based on the balance that the employee maintains in a separate savings account at the 
credit union that serves as collateral for the small dollar loan.  Id.  The highest rate is currently only 12 
percent APR though.  Id. 
316 DESIGNING AN EFFECTIVE AND VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO PAYDAY LENDING: LESSONS FROM THE SAVE 
IT! LOAN, MOUNTAIN ASS’N FOR CMTY. ECON. DEV.,  
http://www.maced.org/files/CCFI%20Learning%20Brief%202010%20web.pdf (last visited April 22, 2013) 
[hereinafter MACED REPORT].  The MACED loan product offered through employers, was paid back 
through payroll deductions, and diverted some of the payments to create savings for the borrowers.  Id. at 2.  
After some adjustments to the product the program was set so that loans could have a principal value of 
$375-$600, carried an 18 percent annual interest rate and $20 application fee, and had 4-10 month terms.  
Id. at 3.  
317 Id. 
 66 
physical store locations and moving most client interaction online.318  The CLC also 
largely adopted MACED’s model of partnering with local employers to access a pool of 
potential borrowers and using payroll deductions to facilitate loan payments.319  This 
arrangement had the added benefit of serving certain underwriting functions (i.e. vetting 
the likelihood that a borrower will repay a loan) in that it made employment verification 
easier and provided a tie between the lender and a major institution in the borrower’s life.  
Tying directly with employers also could reduce some of the risks of not getting paid 
back because the loan payment is taken off the top of the borrower’s salary and reduces 
one of the friction points that can reduce the likelihood of getting paid back.320 
Though the CLC refined its product during its first year of operation,321 the 
program currently works as follows.322  Partner employers sign an agreement called a 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the CLC agreeing to let the CLC offer loans 
to employees and agreeing to use their payroll systems to divert monthly payments to the 
CLC.  Employees are eligible for loans if they are 18 years of age, have social security 
numbers and bank accounts, and have worked for the employer for at least three months.  
Eligible employees can take out loans in an amount that is the lesser of one-half their 
monthly take-home pay or $1000.  Borrowers pay a one-time $20 finance charge and then 
18 percent interest on the amount financed.  Loan terms can be up to twelve months.  The 
combination of interest and fees produces an APR of about 22 percent. 
                                                
318 Personal communication with Nick Mitchell-Bennett; JEWELL, supra note 306, at 4 (“The small-dollar 
nature of the proposed loan product provides little overhead  for the costs of origination and servicing, so 
the Community Loan Center wanted [loan servicing] software that automated as much of the process as 
possible.”). 
319 See MACED REPORT, supra note 316, at 2; Jewell, supra note 306, at 3. 
320 Id. at 9 (discussing Nick Mitchell-Bennett’s experience that potential lending capital investors view the 
payroll deduction feature as reducing the risk that funds with will be lost). 
321 Id. at 4; 
322 Loan Program Details, RGV CMTY. LOAN CTR., http://rgvcommunityloancenter.com/lpdetails.html 
(last visited Apr. 22, 2013); Personal communication with Nick Mitchell-Bennett. 
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To finance the launch of the program, the Multibank applied for and received a 
financial assistance award of $1 million from the U.S. Treasury Department’s 
Community Development Financial Institutions Fund in 2009.323  The awarded funds 
were designated as follows: “$306,250 in capital funds, $61,250 in initial loan loss 
reserves, and $527,000 in startup and staffing funds.”324  The CLC used part of the 
startup and staffing money to hire a former mortgage banker familiar with state lending 
regulation to run the program and to retain lawyers to guide them through the process of 
becoming licensed by the OCCC.325  The licensing process proved much more time-
consuming and expensive than the CLC had anticipated.326  According to an internal 
report, “the Multibank spent roughly a quarter million dollars [$250,000] over two years 
[on building a program that met regulatory requirements] before making the first loan in 
October 2011.”327 
B.  GETTING LICENSED 
Because the CLC was planning to lend money for personal use at rates above 10 
percent a year, the CLC had to apply for a lending license from the OCCC.328  The 
application involves, among other things, submitting financial statements, organizational 
documents such as the Certificate of Formation, a business plan, proposed loan 
documents, and background information about the owners and administrators of the 
                                                
323 Awardee Profiles Details: Greater Brownsville Community Development Corporation, CDFI FUND, 
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,  
http://www.cdfifund.gov/awardees/db/profile.asp?controlnumber=206R47ICMH178KP197GAS185RXF21
5FWAMHFC216KUGR247SYBISTX78BO206HQAXRINN108&programName=FA (last visited April 
22, 2013).  The Rio Grande Valley Multibank was formerly known as the “Greater Brownsville 
Community Development Corporation.”  Id. 
324 JEWELL, supra note 306, at 3. 
325 Id. 
326 Id. at 5. 
327 Id. 
328 See Part II.B.2(a), supra. 
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applicant business.329 The CLC was eventually issued a license to lend in July 2011, nine 
months after first submitting its application.330   
The major challenge in the application process was securing approval for the 
online software platform needed to reduce origination and servicing costs.  Under the 
Texas Administrative Code, regulated lenders have a series of on-going record-keeping 
requirements.331  If an applicant for a lending license plans to use computer software to 
administer loans and otherwise comply with the record-keeping requirement, the 
applicant must use software that has already been approved by the OCCC as being 
capable of fulfilling the regulatory requirements or submit proprietary software for 
approval concurrent with the lending application.332  Because the CLC needed a program 
that could take over most of the roles typically performed by personnel at the lending 
store, the team developing the program concluded that the organization would need to 
create proprietary software that would have to be approved by the OCCC.333   
The CLC identified and contracted with a software vendor that was willing to 
adapt one of its existing products to the CLC’s specifications and submit it for OCCC 
approval.334  The software was submitted for approval in December of 2010, one month 
after the CLC’s basic lending application was submitted to the OCCC.335  After two 
                                                
329 Regulated Lender Licensing Kit, OFFICE OF CONSUMER CREDIT COMM’R, 
http://www.occc.state.tx.us/pages/industry/Lic_frms/Reg/Rkit(040413).pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2013). 
330 JEWELL, supra note 306, at 2. 
331 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §83.828 (2013). 
332 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §83.831 (2012); see also Jewell, supra note 306, at 4-5 (describing the CLC’s 
experience applying for a license for its software). 
333 JEWELL, supra note 306, at 4-5 (“[T]he Community Loan Center wanted software that automated as 
much of the [lending] process as possible.  In particular, they desired software that supported web-based 
loan applications, electronic contract signature, and automated batch servicing.  Unfortunately, only a 
handful of vendors provide software licensed by the OCCC, and none of the available licensed products 
fully met CLC’s need.”) 
334 Id. at 5. 
335 Id. 
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rejections of the software based on concerns that it was not completely aligned with 
regulatory requirements regarding issues such as interest computation, the CLC decided 
to launch its program using less comprehensive (but already OCCC-approved) loan 
servicing software.336  The software developer with which it had been working was 
eventually able to get a program approved that provided many, but not all, of the services 
the CLC desired to minimize its administrative costs.337 
The CLC was finally licensed in July 2011 and started making loans in October of 
that year.338  Its loan product meets the interest rate, term, and other requirements of both 
Subchapters E and F but, though its license covers both subchapters, the CLC has chosen 
to only make loans under Subchapter F.339   
 
C.  OUTCOMES TO DATE 
The program has generally been quite successful and, having used up most of the 
administrative funds provided by the Treasury Department grant, the CLC is projecting 
that its revenue will cover costs after less than two years of operation.340  During its first 
fifteen months the CLC made over 1100 loans worth a total of over $1 million341 and 
these loans are overwhelmingly being paid back in a timely manner.  In December 2012, 
it had 89 delinquent loans, which represents about 8 percent of the loans originated by the 
                                                
336 Id. 
337 Personal communication with Nick Mitchell-Bennett. 
338 JEWELL, supra note 306, at 2. 
339 Personal correspondence with Nick Mitchell-Bennett, April 2, 2013.  According to CLC Small Dollar 
Loan Coordinator Eva Woodfin, because the CLC’s product satisfied the requirements of both subchapters, 
it chose to be licensed under both in order to maximize organizational flexibility in the future.  However, 
because the CLC’s lending software could only generate one type of loan documents, it chose to lend 
exclusively under one of the subchapters and tailor all of the organization’s documents to that set of 
provisions.  Personal correspondence with Eva Woodfin, April 9, 2013. 
340 Personal communication with Nick Mitchell-Bennett. 
341 The data in this section is based on a financial report covering October 2011 to December 31, 2012 that 
was submitted to the CLC’s Board of Directors.  (On file with the author). 
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program342 and appears comparable to the experience of the FDIC pilot participants.  
About $34,000 (6.6 percent of receivables) was 30-120 days delinquent and another 
approximately $28,000, representing about 5 percent of accounts receivable, was more 
than 120 days delinquent.  The delinquency rate tended to be lower earlier in the calendar 
year, increased as more loans were issued, peaked in September, and had another small 
increase during December.  These delinquencies have not all resulted in defaults and the 
CLC only had to write off about $3,800 in 2012. 
The CLC’s small dollar loan program has grown from five employer-partners at 
the end of 2011 to twenty-two in December 2012.343  These employers are a range of 
sizes—the smallest having 5 employees and the largest having 1700344—and have 
varying degrees of employee participation in the loan program.  Some of the smallest 
firms had the highest rates of loans per employer in 2012345 but the larger firms varied 
with respect to the pervasiveness of usage.346 In recruiting participants, “the CLC 
target[ed] employers with a high percentage of staff with low to moderate income,”347 but 
it is unclear why some employers generate more participation than others. 
Interviews conducted for an internal review during the spring of 2012 “suggest 
that borrowers view[ed] the [CLC] as an affordable source of funds” and the main 
criticism has been that borrowers would like the ceiling on the loan amount to be higher 
than the current $1000.348  The human resources personnel who administer the program 
                                                
342 Id. 
343 Id. 
344 Eleven had 20 or fewer employees, seven had between 21 and 100, three had between 101 and 500, and 
one had over 1000.  Id. 
345 Two of the ten-employee employers had 9 loans in 2012, for a rate of .9 loans per employee.   Id. 
346 A 500-employee employer had .63 loans per employee in 2012 but the 1700-employee firm only had 
.06 loans per employee.  
347 Jewell, supra note 306, at 6. 
348 Id. 
 71 
from the employer perspective (helping borrowers access applications, verifying 
employment for the CLC, and setting up payroll deductions) also had a “generally 
positive” view of the program and did not find it especially cumbersome or 
burdensome.349  Finally, though the CLC staff is optimistic about the program’s future 
prospects, the development and launch phases were much more time-consuming and 
expensive than they had anticipated350 and efforts to reduce overhead costs and secure 
additional lending capital are on-going. 
The experience of the CLC seems to demonstrate that there is a market for small 
dollar loans that are more expensive than mainstream, prime credit but that are cheaper 
than the triple-digit APRs that many pay on payday and auto title loans.  Furthermore, 
like the depository institutions that participated in the FDIC pilot program, the CLC’s 
relatively modest delinquency rates suggest that the underbanked are not necessarily bad 
credit risks.  Finally, and perhaps most important for a discussion of lending regulation, 
however, the CLC’s experience demonstrates the high costs involved in developing and 
launching a program that complies with Chapter 342 lending regulations instead of using 
the CSOA.  Thus, although the CLC’s program is adding employer partners, increasing 
loan volume, and is on track to achieve sustainability in the coming year, the ability of 
other non-profit-maximizing organizations in Texas to replicate the model may be limited 
by the extent of the start-up costs. 
  
                                                
349 Id. at 6-7. 
350 Id. at 5. 
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Part V.  Final Analysis and Recommendations 
As long as there are consumers who do not qualify for credit cards and other 
mainstream ways of accessing credit between paychecks and in times of crisis, there will 
always be a market for the products that small-dollar lenders provide.  Historically, when 
legitimate forms of small-dollar lending have been banned, underground or subversive 
markets develop for the products.   Acknowledging that higher cost small dollar loans 
will probably never disappear, the issue for policy makers becomes how to ensure that 
such products are provided in ways that do not result in borrowers—who often do not 
have many assets and live paycheck to paycheck—diverting their scarce financial 
resources to paying fees to lenders worth several times the amount of the cash advanced.   
On the federal level, the CFPB has been given the tools to regulate unfair, 
deceptive, and abusive acts and practices.  While it might be possible to use these tools to 
effectively drive payday lenders out of business, the CFPB should be mindful that, 
historically, other predatory actors have filled the void left when higher cost small-dollar 
lending has been banned.  The FDIC’s recent attempt to encourage mainstream lenders to 
offer small dollar products at below 36 percent APR may be successful but it is too soon 
to tell how many banks will start offering these products and, if they do, what effect this 
will have on the non-bank lending sector.  Furthermore, it is important to note that the 
FDIC’s primary authority is over state, not national, banks.  While the findings of its pilot 
program may persuade national banks to adopt small-dollar loan programs, it is likely 
that some combination of the OCC and Federal Reserve Board would have to be involved 
in encouraging such movement.  If larger, national banks do decide to enter the market 
for affordable small dollar loans they will have to be mindful of the fact that personal 
interaction and a degree of flexibility has often been essential to making such programs 
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work.  For instance, in the CLC case, the connections between the lender and the 
borrower’s employer, as well as the CLC’s willingness to work with delinquent 
borrowers, helped prevent many delinquencies from turning into defaults.  The kind of 
standardized, rigid customer-service models employed by many large corporations would 
have to be modified to account for this aspect of developing successful relationships with 
typical small-dollar loan consumers. 
In the absence of either stricter regulation of non-bank lenders (like closing the 
CSO loophole in Texas) or a critical mass of mainstream banks providing affordable 
small-dollar loan alternatives, the next best option appears to be state-based lenders that 
are committed to creating sustainable lending programs while still charging lower rates 
than the non-bank financial sector has demonstrated that the market will bear.  In Texas, 
examples like the CLC may offer a viable model for organizations geared towards public 
service rather than profit maximization.  Its employer-based, software-centric model 
appears to have addressed many of the inefficiencies related to servicing small-dollar 
loans that have made this type of lending so prohibitively expensive for community 
oriented organizations in the past.  For an organization that can raise the seed capital 
necessary to form an initial loan fund and to cover administrative costs before the 
program starts generating interest and fee revenue, this might be a viable option. 
The CLC is a for-profit organization, however, owned by a CDFI dedicated to 
community development in a particular geographic area.  The up-front costs of getting 
licensed and obtaining the type of software needed to operate under the model in Texas 
might be too costly for 501(c)(3) organizations, which are limited in their ability to 
generate profits through commercial activities and may have trouble accessing lending 
capital because of regulations regarding their ability to produce non-public benefits.  This 
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is particularly frustrating given that non-profit organizations might be able to access 
community development grant money unavailable to for-profit entities.   
 In Texas, small-dollar lending at the rates needed to cover servicing costs is 
regulated by Chapter 342 of the Finance Code and OCCC regulations.  The experience of 
the CLC demonstrates that the process of building a program that complies with the 
regulatory requirements—particularly securing the software needed to reduce origination 
and servicing costs enough to make a viable business model—can be quite costly and 
time-consuming.  If the CLC’s experience—where it took two years (nine months of 
which were spent responding to OCCC concerns that delayed licensing) and almost 
$250,000 to develop and license a program before loans could be made and start 
generating revenue—is typical, it seems unlikely that many other community 
development oriented organizations will be able to enter the market in Texas. 
One partial solution that has been recommended by some consumer advocates is 
that the Finance Commission of Texas could allow provisional licenses for Community 
Development Finance Institutions (CDFI) to make small dollar loans while their 
applications are pending before the OCCC.  While there is always a risk of abuse, a 
provisional license that allows a CDFI to begin originating loans after meeting some 
basic criteria would allow these organizations to expedite the process of generating 
revenue needed to cover some of the administrative costs of getting a program launched.  
Furthermore, if the applicant is also awaiting approval of proprietary software the 
provisional license could require it to use software that has already been approved by the 
OCCC until the full license is issued for the program and proprietary software.  If the 
state decided that consumers benefit from CDFI involvement in the market and wanted to 
promote that involvement, the OCCC could also takes steps to help low-resource 
organizations develop loan programs by providing resources such as model small-dollar 
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loan documents that had been predetermined to meet agency standards.  This would 
reduce both their need to retain expensive legal counsel and the overall start-up costs of 
the program. 
If policy-makers believe that, as Sheila Bair said, we should be working for 
economic inclusion of citizens on all parts of the socioeconomic spectrum, and if they 
want low-to-moderate income borrowers to have access to small-dollar, short-term credit 
at rates less than 300-500 percent APR, they may need to take a multi-pronged approach. 
This would mean promoting and facilitating the development of small dollar programs by 
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